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Abstract
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Europe, as it has become more integrated, has also become more
difficult to write about. — Perry Anderson, The New Old World, p. xi
1 Introduction
From 2006 onwards, an exhibition of photographs has toured galleries in Europe
and the USA, now titled The Ruins of Detroit. The photographs, by Yves Marchand
and Romain Meffre, show various scenes from the recent past of America’s Mo-
tor City: the ruined Spanish-Gothic interior of the United Artists Theater (closed
1984), the abandoned waiting hall of Michigan Central Station (closed 1988), the
derelict ballroom of the Lee Plaza Hotel (closed early 1990s), and an abandoned
school book depository with its textbooks scattered and covered in debris. The
photographs bring home, in a way that statistics do not, what it can mean for
a city or region to experience an extended period of decline. In Detroit’s case,
that decline has been precipitous: from one of America’s wealthiest cities, with
a city population of around 1.8 million at its peak, to a population that is now
around 700,000. It has left the city with falling property values, enough vacant
land to accommodate the whole of Paris, and a rate of violent crime among the
highest of any American city. Economists sometimes refer to changing patterns
of economic activity as ‘adjustment’, but many of those who have lived through
the city’s decline will have experienced it chiefly as a tragedy.
One reason Detroit’s experience has attracted such attention is that relative
decline is rarely so marked, or rapid. The disparities between cities and re-
gions are generally more stable than this, even at times of growth and structural
change. But it is also true that disparities can be substantial and persistent, last-
ing many decades. They can often become an important part of how a country
sees itself, and how it evolves over time. As Judt (1996) notes, the divisions and
tensions between southern and northern Italy are a theme as old as the Italian
state itself. In England, the nineteenth-century writer Elizabeth Gaskell pub-
lished her novel North and South in 1855. More than 150 years later, regional dif-
ferences in living standards, health outcomes, political beliefs and social norms
continue to be summarized as England’s ‘north-south divide’. Similar phenom-
ena can be seen in the developing world, sometimes on an even larger scale.
China’s coastal cities are more prosperous than its inland regions. In India,
there are substantial disparities across states in terms of literacy rates, life ex-
pectancy and living conditions, as well as income (Drèze and Sen 1997). Poverty
rates vary widely within Brazil, with low rates in the booming south-east and
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much higher rates in the rural north-east (Skoufias and Katayama 2011). The list
could easily be multiplied but, as Williamson (1965) remarks, many countries
have a tendency to see their own regional imbalances as uniquely pronounced
and intractable.
This chapter will describe a range of models and evidence that can be used
to understand regional growth and the evolution of spatial disparities over time.
This is an unusually complex topic, and one that requires an eclectic approach
and general equilibrium reasoning. In a long-run spatial equilibrium, house-
holds and firms must not prefer other locations to their current location. As
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) emphasize, this implies that research on places is
vitally different from research on countries, and requires that population, in-
come, and prices are considered simultaneously. Regions are interdependent to
an even greater extent than countries, and there is a real sense in which regional
growth is a harder topic than national growth.
There is a further departure from the standard competitive paradigm. A
long tradition in urban economics and economic geography explains the struc-
ture of cities and economic activity in terms of various externalities. These have
the potential to generate inefficient and undesirable outcomes. Although some
externalities are reasonably well understood, at least in theory, others are not.
The example of Detroit shows how one mechanism in regional decline will be
changes in crime and social norms, amplifying changes that originated else-
where. Recent empirical work on local institutional variation within developing
countries, such as Dell (2010), suggests remarkably powerful and long-lived ef-
fects of this variation. The reasons for this remain unclear, but could include not
only the persistence of institutions, but also the intergenerational transmission
of social norms and political beliefs. Economists have only just begun to engage
with such complex forces.
These points hint that a single ‘canonical’ model of regional growth is neither
likely nor desirable. There are so many interesting research questions that it
would be a mistake to seek or impose a single framework. The chapter will
discuss how spatial disparities evolve over time; the circumstances in which
there is a ‘regional problem’; how differences in regional living standards and
productivity can arise; the data and methods used to study regional growth; and
the forces that drive regional growth and regional decline.
Some of these questions are too intertwined to address sequentially. As in the
literature on national economic growth, it can be a mistake to attempt a sharp
distinction between ‘growth’ and ‘levels’, as if these two phenomena necessarily
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require separate models. In practice, it makes little sense to write about regional
growth without taking a view on what determines relative levels of income per
capita. But we also note that ‘regional growth’ does not only mean growth in
average living standards. In common usage, it often means growth in relative
population or total income, as a region outperforms others. One theme of our
chapter is that changes in the relative sizes or population densities of regions
merit more attention from researchers. For the study of decline, in particular, it is
important to analyze depopulation rather than simply relative living standards.
Another complication is even more fundamental. Productivity growth is ac-
companied by, and to a large extent inseparable from, changing patterns of ag-
glomeration and dispersion. Growth will respond to, and bring, changes in de-
mand patterns, sectoral and occupational structure, skill levels, transport costs
and infrastructure, financial development, and even local institutions and polit-
ical economy. All of these could reconfigure the spatial structure of population
and production. Yet modelling growth and agglomeration as outcomes of a
joint process is far from straightforward, as Krugman (1995) noted. We call this
‘the hard problem’ of regional economics, and review some models that seek to
address it.
When we turn to the evidence, we depart from existing surveys by con-
sidering a wider range of countries. The New Economic Geography literature
has tended to focus on Europe, Japan and the USA, but the study of regional
prosperity is even more important for contemporary developing countries, as
Venables (2005) emphasizes. After all, some Chinese provinces and Indian states
exceed many countries in population and land area. These include India’s Uttar
Pradesh (population around 200 million), and Maharashtra and Bihar (both in
excess of 100 million). Guangdong province in China has a population of more
than 100 million once migrants are included. The intrinsic importance of this
should be clear, and the consideration of developing countries has a further be-
nefit, widening the scope of the available evidence. Recent work has opened up
some startling research possibilities, not least through the use of satellite data on
light density at night to map activity at the sub-national level.
A final theme will be the formidable identification problems that arise in
studying regional data. Some can be seen in narrow terms as spatial depend-
ence; for example, errors in a regression model will often be correlated across
regions. But more fundamentally, the requirements of spatial equilibrium will
link regional outcomes and characteristics so tightly that it is rarely clear how
to recover causal effects. This continues to be a major obstacle to understanding
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regional growth or making policy recommendations. We will discuss a range of
empirical methods, which recover causal effects with varying degrees of plaus-
ibility, and the complementary role of structural models.
With all this in mind, the coverage of the chapter is intentionally broad, not
to say sprawling. Over the past two decades, after long years of neglect, eco-
nomists have developed a rich theoretical and empirical literature on economic
geography, chiefly inspired by Krugman (1991). But concurrently, and largely
independently, researchers working on growth and development have studied
the effects of policy reforms and institutional variation using sub-national data.
Influential papers include Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Besley and Burgess (2000),
Holmes (1998), Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), and Tabellini (2010), but these are
just a few examples from an increasingly extensive literature. An important aim
of this chapter is to bring these various strands of research together, and use
them to interpret each other.
To keep the scope of the chapter manageable, we also need to set some limits
to what we cover. We emphasize work in economics, and especially recent work
that takes a general equilibrium approach. This is a significant limitation, be-
cause the study of regional outcomes extends well beyond economics, to include
research in geography, urban planning, sociology, statistics, and demography.
From the mid-1950s onwards, elements of these approaches began to coalesce in
the interdisciplinary field of regional science. This field has sometimes drawn on
ideas from economics, such as applied general equilibrium modelling, adapted
to include a spatial dimension.1 It is clear, however, that the traditional methods
of regional science are rarely well-adapted to the study of regional growth and
convergence dynamics. Their roots lie in static models, or in empirical meth-
ods that will rarely identify causal effects within a spatial equilibrium. It is also
noticeable that, when textbooks on regional economics turn to growth, the ap-
proaches presented lack coherence. They range across basic trade-theoretic ana-
lyses, through closed-economy one-sector growth models, to an emphasis on the
demand-side role of regional exports and trade balances. Each time, it is all too
easy to see what is missing: interesting dynamics, an explicit spatial dimension,
a central role for supply adjustments and constraints. For all the benefits of an
eclectic or interdisciplinary approach, many of the interesting questions demand
general equilibrium reasoning, and the task is lost without it.
This should be clear if we consider one of the strongest associations in the
data. Gennaioli et al. (2013a) emphasize that regional output per capita is
1An overview of quantitative methods in regional science can be found in Isard et al. (1998).
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strongly correlated with average human capital. In a regression of output per
capita on average years of education and country dummies, using 1500 regions
across 105 countries, they find that education explains 38% of the variation in
output per capita within countries. This is striking, but nobody would propose
that regions within a country are each endowed with a fixed stock of skilled
workers. Investigating the association requires models in which regional factor
supplies are endogenous to the location decisions of workers and firms; Gen-
naioli et al. construct one such model, and alternatives will be considered below.
In summary, the study of regional growth often requires structural models
that draw heavily on economic ideas; an understanding of the various forms
of interdependence between regions; and empirical methods that can overcome
the identification problems raised by that interdependence. We take these en-
deavours as our central focus, rather than the much wider literature in regional
science and geography.2 Nor do we provide a discussion of regional policies:
these require an understanding of the mechanisms at work in regional growth
and regional decline, but we do not develop the links explicitly. Finally, we note
that some of the analytical issues overlap with those of urban economics; for
discussion of ideas specific to urban economics and the growth of cities, see the
chapter by Duranton and Puga in this volume.
The remainder of the chapter considers different perspectives in turn. Section
2 looks at convergence and polarization, the associated methods, and some styl-
ized facts. Section 3 will discuss the nature and interpretation of spatial dispar-
ities, and when they matter. The remaining sections, which are really the heart
of the chapter, investigate the drivers of regional growth and decline. Section 4
covers an array of relevant models. Section 5 sets out two classes of models that
consider growth and agglomeration jointly. We then review empirical methods
(section 6) and some of the main findings (section 7). Section 8 briefly discusses
regional decline as a distinct phenomenon, while section 9 concludes.
2 Convergence, divergence, polarization
Do regional economies have a tendency to move closer together, grow in paral-
lel, or move further apart? This question has spurred many empirical studies,
2For a broader perspective, see Clark et al. (2000). The relationship between work in eco-
nomics and geography has been extensively discussed, as in Brakman et al. (2009, chapter 12),
Krugman (1995) and Ottaviano and Thisse (2005). Brakman et al. also survey regional growth,
as does Harris (2010). For a discussion of the regional policy implications of recent work by
economists, see Combes (2011).
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but is surprisingly difficult to answer. Part of the problem may lie with the ques-
tion. We are interested in how a distribution of outcomes evolves over time, but
distributions can behave in complex ways, and much is lost by collapsing this
behaviour into a crude binary opposition between convergence and divergence
(Durlauf et al. 2009). As in the literature on national growth, part of the interest
in these questions revolves around more complex possibilities. These include
distinct ‘convergence clubs’, or the emergence of polarization. A related ques-
tion is that of mobility within the distribution. Since a detailed survey of regional
convergence is already available (Magrini 2004) we emphasize the studies that
are especially relevant to understanding regional growth, or that have emerged
over the last decade of research. The details of some of the more technical meth-
ods, using time series concepts, transition matrices, or mixtures of densities, can
be found in the appendix to the chapter.
2.1 Beta-convergence
Do regions converge to the same level of income per capita? Our starting point
is Figure 1, which shows annualized growth against initial income per capita for
47 contiguous US states, using data for 1880 and 1990.3 This is similar to figure
11.2 presented in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and uses their data. At first
glance, the strength of the correlation between growth and initial income per
capita is decisive evidence for the absolute convergence of regions; they draw
attention to the high R2, 0.92, of a regression close to that shown. At first glance,
this suggests that regional disparities are transitory phenomena.
The figure is a little deceptive, however. To see this, consider what would
happen if two regions with the same initial income differed in their growth
rates, so that one region was slightly above the regression line and one slightly
below. Over the 110 years between 1880 and 1990, this small difference in growth
rates would compound to imply a large difference in relative levels. Hence, even
the strong negative correlation in figure 1 does not imply that spatial disparities
will be eliminated. To show this, figure 2 presents the same data in a different
way, showing income per capita relative to the median region in 1990 against
that in 1880, together with a 45-degree line. The shallow slope of the (dashed)
regression line is consistent with mean reversion, but using the vertical axis, it is
also clear that significant differences in living standards across US states remain.
The richest state has more than twice as much income per capita as the poorest.
3The state missing from the 48 contiguous states is Oklahoma, which lacks data for 1880
given its late statehood.
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Figure 1: Absolute convergence?
This is contrary to what might have been expected from figure 1, but in line with
the common sense view that regional disparities persist over time.4
Worldwide, regional disparities are pervasive and substantial, especially in
poorer countries. Using data on 1537 regions across 107 countries, for the year
2005, Gennaioli et al. (2013a) report that the average ratio of income per capita
in the richest region to the poorest region is 4.41. The ratio is 3.77 for Africa, 5.63
for Asia, 3.74 for Europe, 4.60 for North America, and 5.61 for South America.
The ratios are substantially higher in some cases, including Indonesia, Mexico
and Russia. Most of these figures do not correct for price levels, which are often
higher in richer regions. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that price differentials
could account for the majority of the variation in nominal incomes.
The early literature on beta-convergence was highly successful in drawing
attention to the rich interest of regional growth, and spurred a major research
effort in the area. But the specific approach has also drawn criticism, partly on
econometric grounds that we discuss in the appendix, and partly because the
results can be hard to interpret. This is because they rely on viewing regional
data through the prism of the neoclassical growth model. Indeed, it is often as-
serted that regional data provide an ideal testing ground for that model. These
claims are misplaced, because the neoclassical model typically rules out cross-
4There are some changes in rankings — the Spearman rank correlation is 0.47 — and beta-
convergence is sometimes argued to be informative about mobility; but it is not straightforward
to map an estimated convergence rate onto a readily-interpreted scale for a mobility index.
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Figure 2: Long-run disparities
border flows of goods, services, capital and labour. The assumption that regions
are closed to such flows is hardly attractive. But allowing for these flows is not
straightforward, and general equilibrium models rarely lead to simple regres-
sion specifications. These perspectives suggest that beta-convergence studies
will miss a great deal, and other methods are needed.
2.2 Inequality and polarization
When considering regional convergence, a useful starting point is to ask whether
the cross-section variability of income per capita is increasing, stable, or falling
over time. The most prominent version of this is sigma-convergence, which con-
siders the evolution of the standard deviation (σ) of the logarithm of income per
capita; regions are said to be converging if the standard deviation is falling over
time (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991). This measure of regional inequality is not
Lorenz-consistent, but could be replaced with the Gini coefficient, the coefficient
of variation (as in Williamson 1965), or the Theil measures. The Theil measures,
and other members of the generalized entropy class, have the significant advant-
age for regional analysis that they are decomposable; see Cowell (2011) for a
textbook treatment.
A further question is whether or not to weight regions by their populations;
Milanovic (2005b) provides a discussion of this. If the aim is to capture the
spatial inequality perceived by a randomly-drawn individual, then weighting by
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population is natural, as in Williamson (1965) and many subsequent papers. But
for the analysis of regional growth, a researcher might be interested in the effects
of physical geography, institutions and policies. In that case, it might be sensible
to give regions equal weight even when they vary in size, rather than allow the
results to be dominated by the characteristics of the largest regions.
As a first step in a descriptive exercise, the study of inequality measures is
often valuable. But a given time path for regional inequality could correspond
to a variety of underlying processes, with different long-run implications. A
small group of regions may diverge from a larger group; as a result, measured
inequality could increase even while a large number of regions grow in parallel.
A related possibility is that the distribution becomes polarized. This term is often
used rather loosely, to indicate some degree of high or rising inequality across
regions. The view that deregulated market economies give rise to excessive
polarization, in various senses, is especially common on the political left (for
example, Dorling 2011); others use the term to indicate a ‘disappearing middle’
or ‘clustering around extremes’.
On a more formal definition, polarization can be seen as concerned with mul-
tiple modes, the distance between these modes, and the distribution of probab-
ility mass around them. Drawing on Duclos et al. (2004), imagine that there is
reduced variation in living standards at two different ranges of the regional in-
come distribution. This is likely to reduce inequality, but polarization increases,
since the contrast between the two groups is made sharper and more visible.
More generally, polarization - in this technical sense - can increase even as the
cross-section dispersion in living standards falls. These arguments suggest the
need to look beyond inequality, using methods reviewed in the appendix to this
chapter.
2.3 Findings
It seems inevitable that regional disparities will sometimes be compounded by
growth and agglomeration. Seen against the long span of human history, current
disparities may be a comparatively recent phenomenon; Bairoch (1993) argued
that there was considerable uniformity in development levels in the early mod-
ern period (say, 1500-1800). One empirical approach relates regional inequality
to the national level of development, as in the classic paper by Williamson (1965).
He hypothesized an inverse-U relationship, with regional inequality rising and
then falling as development proceeded. More recently, Barrios and Strobl (2009)
examine the relationship using data for 12 European countries over 1975-2000.
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The data plotted in their figure 2 suggest that regional inequality is increasing
at lower levels of development, before either levelling off or reducing some-
what, but rarely returning to its initial level. For a much larger set of countries,
Lessmann (2011) finds some evidence for the inverse-U relationship over 1980-
2009, with regional inequality peaking at a development level close to that of,
say, Mexico or the Czech Republic. He also finds some evidence that regional
inequality increases at very high levels of GDP per capita (roughly, Canada’s
level).
A more common approach in the literature, following Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1991), has been to consider the evolution of regional inequality over time. Some-
times data on regional output are used, and sometimes data on income. For a
few countries, including China and Indonesia, region-specific price deflators are
available. For developing countries in particular, the treatment of natural re-
source revenues can be important to the results. Differences across regions in
age structure, employment rates and part-time work are another complicating
factor. We defer a more thorough discussion of regional data until section 6
below.
A mixture density approach (see the appendix) has been applied to European
regions by Pittau (2005) and Pittau and Zelli (2006). Their work suggests a mul-
timodal structure for the 1970s and early 1980s, and represents the distribution
as a mixture of two well-separated normal densities. These two clusters later
converge. They also find that, from the mid-1990s, a small group of very rich re-
gions (Brussels, Hamburg, Île de France and Luxembourg) moves further ahead,
a result also highlighted by Enflo (2010). This suggests recent polarization, and
also indicates that using a benchmark region or weighted average to assess con-
vergence is risky. Evidence for polarization also emerges from other studies,
including Canova (2004).
An alternative approach is based on transition matrices or stochastic kernel
densities. In applications of these methods, the stationary distribution for the US
states appears to be unimodal (Johnson 2000) while the stationary distribution
for European regions is more likely to appear bimodal. But one of the most
sophisticated time-series studies of the US, that by Carvalho and Harvey (2005),
finds that the two richest ‘macro-regions’, New England and the Mid-East, have
pulled away from others over time. This indicates some degree of polarization
may be emerging for the US as well as Europe.
For Japanese prefectures, Sala-i-Martin (1996) found a sharp decline in the
dispersion of average personal income between 1940 and 1955, and a smaller
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decline in the 1970s. At a more disaggregated level, Seya et al. (2012) found
a decline in the log variance across Japanese municipalities over the 1990s, and
a slight increase in the 2000s. For Russia, the usual finding is that regional
disparities increased sharply in the first years of the post-Soviet era (for ex-
ample, Fedorov 2002) and were high in comparison to many other countries;
more recently, over the course of the 2000s, they seem to have fallen (Guriev and
Vakulenko 2012).
The experiences of many developing countries are at least as interesting. The
literature on China, in particular, is extensive. It typically finds divergence for
the 1970s, followed by a period of convergence in the wake of agricultural re-
forms, and then further divergence during the rapid industrialization of the
1990s (for example, Weeks and Yao 2003). For the 1990s onwards, the fast growth
of the coastal provinces is often emphasized, consistent with a story in which
market access has promoted industrial development. Démurger et al. (2002)
note the importance of three exceptionally rich provinces, Beijing, Tianjin, and
Shanghai, in raising the overall degree of regional inequality. But even exclud-
ing these provinces, regional inequality rose over the 1990s. It is substantially
higher than India’s, a finding that is conventionally explained in terms of barri-
ers to mobility within China (for example, Gajwani et al. 2006).
Milanovic (2005b) studies regional inequality in the five federations of Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia and the US, over the 1980s and 1990s. For Brazil, he
finds no clear trend; Azzoni (2001) studies Brazil for a longer period (1939-1995)
and finds an overall decline, although one interrupted by a sharp increase in
the 1970s. For India and Indonesia, Milanovic finds regional inequality to have
increased. Hill et al. (2008) also study Indonesia, but find that the coefficient
of variation of non-mining output per capita was broadly stable over 1975-2004,
despite fast growth.5 The reason for the inconsistent findings is not clear, and
more generally, Milanovic (2005b) notes that the field lacks a consistent termin-
ology and approach.6
Convergence methods have sometimes been applied to variables beyond in-
come or output. Evans and Karras (1996) found evidence for rapid conditional
convergence of TFP for the contiguous US states, and similarly rapid mean re-
version for the returns to capital, computed using data on capital-output ratios
and factor shares. Overall, their results point to inter-region capital mobility, but
5If mining is included, the coefficient of variation declined sharply in the 1970s and 1980s.
6The picture may be worse than he suggests: some papers on convergence make basic errors
in the use of inequality measures, such as calculating the standard deviation of income rather
than log income, or calculating the coefficient of variation using log income.
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also that US states are converging to region-specific steady-states determined by
long-run differences in productivity.
The convergence behaviour of regional house prices has also been studied.
This is interesting in its own right, but also because housing costs will be de-
termined jointly with incomes, and hence informative about the mechanisms
generating spatial disparities. Using a model-based approach to US data from
1975, Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) emphasize that inequality in (quality-
adjusted) house prices across US regions has risen substantially. By calibrating
a model with a spatial equilibrium, they argue that increased dispersion of re-
gional productivity is needed to explain the US data. Their analysis demon-
strates the benefits of studying movements in cross-section dispersion using a
structural model, rather than treating the study of convergence as solely an eco-
nometric problem; we return to this point later.
3 Do regional disparities matter?
At first glance, differences in average living standards across regions contribute
to overall inequality, and involve some degree of unfairness or injustice, with so-
cial and political consequences. An individual born in a depressed region may
have fewer opportunities and poorer life chances than an individual born in a
more prosperous region of the same country. A widely-held view is that uneven
regional development can undermine social cohesion and generate political ten-
sions. This seems especially likely in those developing countries where regional
disparities coincide with the spatial distribution of ethnic groups or natural re-
sources. But the issue is not confined to developing countries, as witnessed by
regional tensions within Belgium and Italy, among other countries. Judt (1996)
prophesized that the project of European integration would eventually be un-
dermined by polarization between dominant ‘super-regions’ — such as Baden-
Württemberg, Rhône-Alpes, Lombardy and Catalonia — and an economically
depressed periphery.7 The European Union has made strengthening ‘cohesion’
across the regions of its member states a major priority, enshrined by treaty, and
around a third of the central EU budget is directed at policies to reduce spatial
disparities.
7In his view, the richer regions would be likely to identify themselves ever more closely with
Europe, while the less successful periphery would see increasing scepticism and resentment
about the European project, and perhaps a resurgence of nationalism.
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3.1 Composition effects and welfare
Much of this is familiar, but care is needed over the meaning of ‘living stand-
ards’, and their comparison across space. In simple models, if workers can
move freely between regions, then returns to worker characteristics are equal-
ized across space, at least in the long run.8 Spatial differences in average income
per capita do not map straightforwardly into spatial inequality in life chances,
welfare differences, or life satisfaction. In a spatial equilibrium, regional dis-
parities will often reflect composition effects. An agricultural region may have
relatively low income per capita not because it is ‘depressed’, inefficient, or its
workers underpaid, but because the relatively unskilled account for a high share
of its employment, or because its activities are relatively labour-intensive.
These points apply more broadly, and their importance is supported empir-
ically. Acemoglu and Dell (2010) show that approximately half of the within-
country, between-region inequality in labour income in the Americas (Canada,
U.S. and Latin America) can be accounted for by differences in workers’ educa-
tion and experience. Another branch of the literature uses household-level data
to account for regional differences in household composition, and to estimate
how the returns to characteristics vary across locations; relevant studies include
Nguyen et al. (2007) for Vietnam and Skoufias and Katayama (2011) for Brazil.
Nguyen et al. find that, in their data for 1993, the urban-rural gap in house-
hold consumption per capita is primarily due to differences in covariates such
as education, ethnicity, and age, and this is true throughout the distribution. In
survey data for 1998, however, there is more evidence for differences in returns
to covariates between the urban and rural sectors. In the case of Brazil, Skoufias
and Katayama find that differences in household composition account for most
of the inter-regional differences in consumption, but find some evidence for dif-
ferences in returns across metropolitan areas, and between metropolitan and
non-metropolitan urban areas.9
The importance of composition effects for income comparisons is clear. Less
widely appreciated, a similar argument applies to spatial comparisons of hap-
piness or well-being. The literature often assumes that a spatial equilibrium
requires utility to be equalized across locations, but this will only happen if in-
8For a model that does give rise to spatial variation in skill premia, see Davis and Dingel
(2012).
9They attribute these return differences to agglomeration economies, but this argument is not
complete, because labour mobility should equalize returns across locations even in the presence
of such economies. As in the case of Vietnam, alternative explanations could include a short-
run disequilibrium, or unmeasured differences in characteristics (such as those in ability or the
quality of schooling); Young (2013) emphasizes this latter possibility.
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dividuals are homogeneous. When individuals differ, average well-being is also
likely to differ in equilibrium (Deaton and Dupriez 2011). To give a concrete
example, if retirees are happier than the middle-aged, and especially likely to
move to Florida, then average self-reported happiness will tend to be relatively
high in Florida. Again, compositional effects give rise to differences in average
outcomes.
Although these effects make interpretations uncertain, Pittau et al. (2010)
document some interesting differences in self-reported life satisfaction across
European regions, with especially wide variation in Belgium, Germany, Italy,
Portugal and Spain. For reasons that are unclear, residents of capital cities are
especially likely to report low levels of life satisfaction. Knight and Gunatilaka
(2011) summarize their work on happiness in China, which finds that (perhaps
unexpectedly) mean urban happiness is slightly below mean rural happiness,
while households of rural migrants living in the cities report lower average hap-
piness than other urban households. But the compositions of these populations
may differ in terms of characteristics that are hard to observe.
Oswald and Wu (2010, 2011) study differences in self-reported well-being
across US states, and emphasize that these differences are not modest. Their
data allow them to control for a variety of personal characteristics, and therefore
address composition effects. The overall argument in Oswald and Wu (2010)
is that well-being, conditional on individual characteristics including income
category, is correlated with measures of local amenities (measuring non-income
aspects of quality-of-life) extracted separately from a compensating-differentials
approach, in earlier work by Gabriel et al. (2003). This correlation is seen as
independent validation of the well-being measures. For the present chapter, it
is more noteworthy that the correlation is consistent with a spatial equilibrium
under labour mobility, in which the income received by a given type of worker
will be lower in those states with good amenities.
Composition effects have a stark consequence. If heterogeneous workers are
allowed to sort across locations within a market economy, then regional dispar-
ities in average incomes and even average life satisfaction are inevitable, and a
condition of efficiency. This line of argument seems to conflict with common
sense: surely equality across regions is obviously desirable? What the common-
sense view misses is the need to follow Sen (1980), and ask ‘equality of what?’.
One possible criterion is to compare the utilities of a given type of individual
across space. But, for the reasons just explained, a long-run equilibrium which
equalizes these utilities will rarely equalize average outcomes.
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3.2 When is there a regional problem?
Although the logic of a spatial equilibrium is powerful, the perception remains
that uneven regional development is problematic. The literature often suggests
that a spatial equilibrium will be inefficient, because externalities play a central
role. Outside economics, observers often suggest that regional disparities are
a form of social injustice. At a minimum, economists risk underestimating the
burdens of adjustment; the experience of Detroit is a salutary reminder of a
harsher reality.
One concern is that growth and agglomeration in a core area could make
those living in the periphery worse off, even in absolute terms. This will be a
particular concern when there are barriers or frictions that restrict the mobility
of individuals or firms, and labour mobility may be especially difficult for the
poor.10 But there are ways in which injustice could arise even when mobility is
unrestricted. It may be that human capital is relatively costly to acquire in poorer
regions; since children cannot choose where to locate, regional disparities would
contribute to differences in life chances and inequality. Olivetti and Paserman
(2013) argue that, given the tendency for children to remain in the same region
as their parents, regional disparities help to explain the decline in social mobility
seen in the US in the first part of the twentieth century. Durlauf (2012) discusses
the possible relevance of poverty trap ideas at the regional level.
Another argument is that spatial equilibrium takes time to achieve. There
could be lengthy periods for which utility differences persist. Those who leave
declining regions are likely to experience significant disruption in their lives,
relative to the residents of more prosperous regions. Moreover, life chances may
be influenced, in ways that economists have rarely analyzed. This perspective
could imply less emphasis on comparisons of averages, and more on regional
differences in labour markets, as in the work of Overman and Puga (2002) on the
spatial polarization of European unemployment rates. But even this argument
is not straightforward; in models based on matching frictions, if workers can
move freely between locations, the asset value of unemployment will be the
same across locations.11
10Guriev and Vakulenko (2012) find evidence for poverty-related immobility in Russia in the
1990s, and Phan and Coxhead (2010) for Vietnam.
11See Satchi and Temple (2009) and Kline and Moretti (2013) for related analyses. In a dual
economy model with matching frictions, the ‘urban’ region could mean one city, or urban areas
at multiple locations, each with the same labour market tightness, but of indeterminate relative
size.
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3.3 The origins of regional disparities
What are the underlying causes of regional differences in prosperity? Later sec-
tions of the chapter will consider this question in detail. But a useful first step is
to set history to one side, and investigate the relative contributions of proximate
influences, such as physical or human capital. For the purpose of an accounting
exercise, we can adopt the simplifying device of a regional production function:
piYi = pi AiKαi (hiLi)
1−α (1)
where Yi denotes the aggregate level of output of region i, pi the price of
output net of trade costs incurred by local firms, Ai is total factor productivity,
Ki is the region’s capital stock, and hiLi is the region’s supply of effective units of
labour, where hi is the average human capital level. Our primary interest in this
section is to see how much of the variation in piYi can be explained by variation
in the factors on the right-hand side of (1).
This exercise is a regional counterpart to the cross-country literature on de-
velopment accounting reviewed by Caselli (2005) and Hsieh and Klenow (2010).
The main finding of that literature is that international output differences are
only partially explained by differences in physical capital and educational at-
tainment, with the majority accounted for by total factor productivity, measured
as a residual term. Hsieh and Klenow (2010) suggest that TFP accounts for 50-
70% of cross-country output differences, with human and physical capital only
accounting for 10-30% and 20% respectively. Should we expect similar findings
at the regional level?
Aiello and Scoppa (2000) and Scoppa (2007) investigate this for Italy, and
Tamura (2012) for the US. For some countries, regional data are more detailed
than cross-country data; human and physical capital may be available over
longer periods of time, and at lower levels of aggregation. A disadvantage is
that regional price levels (pi) are often unobserved, although Tamura (2012) uses
(limited) information on regional price dispersion in the US.12 Broadly speaking,
these studies tend to confirm the cross-country finding that TFP is more import-
ant than human and physical capital in explaining output differences. However,
this conclusion is sensitive to the way in which human capital is measured. For
example, Scoppa (2007) finds that using quality-adjusted education levels can
raise the contribution of human capital to over 50%.
12We discuss regional price deflators in the appendix to this chapter. Another issue for some
studies is that the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technologies is restrictive; Bernard et al. (2013)
find evidence against this assumption for the US.
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Other papers also find that regional prosperity and average human capital are
strongly associated. This includes work on spatial sorting, drawing on the urban
economics literature. Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2008) use a large panel
of French employees (close to 20 million observations for the years 1976-1998) to
isolate the importance of skill composition in explaining local variation in wages.
They find that up to half of the variation in wages across 341 French employment
areas can be explained by differences in skills. For 119 areas of Great Britain,
Rice, Venables and Patacchini (2006) find a smaller, but still substantial, role for
occupational composition.13
The evidence points in a consistent direction. In the study of regional prosper-
ity, a key question is why skilled individuals are more likely to choose to locate
in some regions than others. To answer this question needs general equilibrium
models that can map regional characteristics into endogenous outcomes such as
the supply of skills in each region, other factor supplies, and (in some cases) the
endogenous determination of total factor productivity. Much of the rest of the
chapter will be about this endeavour.
Before we describe the relevant theories, there is another point to note. We
have discussed differences in outcomes across locations, but we have not allowed
the nature of those locations to play a determining role. At least since Adam
Smith’s Wealth of Nations, it has been acknowledged that regional outcomes are
related to their physical geography. It seems equally clear that outcomes are re-
lated to the outcomes of neighbours, and more broadly, to economic geography.
To illustrate this, we plot regional GDP per capita against distance from Lux-
embourg, for a large number of European regions; see Figure 3, reproduced
from Breinlich (2006). The strong correlation suggests that models of regional
prosperity will need to engage with physical and economic geography.
A range of other observations support the idea that regional prosperity is
connected with geography. There are clear spatial correlations of activity within
most countries. Activity tends to gravitate towards areas with relatively good
transport links, and close to large markets. It is unlikely to be an accident that
much of China’s industrial development has been concentrated on its coast, or
that Brazil’s interior is poorer than its coastal cities. Even for a well-integrated,
developed economy such as the US, much activity is located on the coast, while
13These findings are based on a decomposition of earnings differences, but as in cross-country
variance decompositions, it is not clear how covariance terms should be treated. Duranton and
Monastiriotis (2002) study changes in regional wage inequality in the United Kingdom, between
1982 and 1997, and especially the divergence between London and other regions. This was
mainly driven by a stronger rise in education levels in the capital and an increase in relative skill
premia.
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Figure 3: Regional GDP and proximity to Luxembourg
population movements are influenced by aspects of physical geography, such as
climate.
4 Models of regional prosperity
Geography clearly matters, but understanding its implications often requires
formal models. As in other general equilibrium contexts, such as the study of
international trade, informal reasoning can easily go astray. Yet for a long time,
the study of regional prosperity was rather overlooked by economists. In the
post-war period, it tended to attract those who were sceptical about some of
the tools and findings of conventional economic theory. The complexities of the
regional growth process were interesting in themselves, but could also be used
to illustrate reservations about economic theory (and general equilibrium theory
in particular) that applied more widely.
Perhaps the best-known contribution along these lines is that of Myrdal
(1957). He argued that market forces would lead to divergence between regions
and ongoing disequilibrium, driven by ‘cumulative causation’, or the tendency
for a change in a given direction (such as an increase in one region’s productiv-
ity) to instigate further changes in the same direction. Kaldor (1970) took up this
theme, emphasizing that localized industrial development generates cumulative
advantages, due to various forms of increasing returns. But Hirschman (1958)
had already countered that such views went too far. Although some degree of
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uneven development was inevitable, it would be self-limiting: as regions moved
apart, there would be powerful forces working to limit further divergence.
The further development of the literature has revealed some truth in both sets
of positions. A contemporary treatment will rarely see an inherent contradiction
in the coexistence of feedback effects and the study of an equilibrium; but it is
likely to follow Myrdal in stressing the importance of these feedback effects for
analysing regional prosperity. Agglomeration may promote further agglomera-
tion, and initiate other changes that are part of a larger, self-sustaining process.
Further, Myrdal and Kaldor were interested in the idea that the forces which
drive growth and agglomeration are not readily separable, and this recognition
continues to pose a major challenge for theorists.
4.1 A theoretical challenge
The formal general equilibrium models of the 1950s and 1960s typically assumed
perfect competition, so that firms are price takers in markets for output and
factors. But when firm and individual location decisions are introduced in real-
istic ways, perfect competition can rarely accommodate an interesting equilib-
rium. Consider what happens when output depends on capital and labour, and
these factors can move freely between regions. In that case, workers and firms
will all move to whichever region has the highest total factor productivity.
This argument can be expressed in more formal terms. For location decisions
to be non-trivial, imagine that individuals and firms must choose an address,
and these choices affect their utility and profitability respectively. This assumes
some indivisibility in the way they spread their consumption and production
activity across space, and also assumes — for space to play a determining role
— that there are transaction or transport costs involved when consumption and
production are geographically separated. These are realistic assumptions, but
they cause the competitive paradigm to break down (Starrett 1978). A sufficient
condition for this breakdown is that different locations have the same charac-
teristics. Then, either there is no equilibrium with perfect competition, or all
individuals and firms gather in a single location. More formally, if preferences
are monotone, space is homogeneous, and transport is costly, there is no com-
petitive equilibrium which involves transportation.
To generate an interesting location problem, localized externalities and indi-
visibilities at the level of individual firms and workers are necessary. But it is
costly transportation that ultimately gives substance to the effects of geography.
In the absence of transport costs, space is immaterial even when individuals
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have distinct locations. Scotchmer and Thisse (1992) call this the folk theorem
of spatial economics. It underpins two laws of economic geography set out by
Prager and Thisse (2012): not all activities are available everywhere (the first
law) and what happens close to us is more important than what happens far
from us (the second law).14
These ideas play a fundamental role in the economic analysis of spatial equi-
librium. In the literature that followed Krugman (1991), they have been stud-
ied by allowing for increasing returns and market size effects. This has been
achieved by sacrificing generality, using various simplifying devices. But mak-
ing even these models dynamic is not straightforward. Theorists face a trade-off,
balancing the demands of realistic geographic and spatial considerations against
the simplicity needed for a manageable dynamic analysis. Since agglomeration
and growth are complex phenomena on their own, often models with proper
geography lack interesting dynamics, while models with interesting dynamics
lack proper geography. We use this idea to organize our discussion of various
formal models. We first consider growth models that are largely without spatial
considerations (‘growth without geography’); multi-sector models with some
limited spatial content or implications (‘growth with limited geography’); and
spatial models largely without dynamics (‘geography with limited growth’). The
hardest problem, to model growth and agglomeration jointly, is deferred until
section 5; we call this ‘geography and growth’.
4.2 Growth without geography
Asked to consider regional prosperity, some economists have settled on a default
approach, which is to see whether progress can be made by ignoring space
altogether. At its extreme, this approach treats regions as if they are separate
countries. Their locations may differ, but space has no determining role. Trade
in goods, and the movement of factors between regions, are either frictionless or
(more commonly) ruled out altogether. We call this form of approach ‘growth
without geography’.
In particular, various neoclassical growth models remain an organizing frame-
work for some research. They are used to think about the determinants of pro-
ductivity levels, and to motivate many of the convergence studies discussed in
section 2 above. This might be a useful place to start, but it is no place to end. By
construction, the models cannot account for the patterns of spatial dependence
14Also note Tobler’s first law of geography: everything is related to everything else, but near
things are more related than distant things.
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seen in the data, or changes in the spatial distribution of economic activity. The
neoclassical growth models have dynamics — capital accumulation, productiv-
ity growth — but, to borrow the words from a popular song, they don’t know
much about geography.
The most sophisticated defence of the neoclassical growth model is that given
by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). They argue that, provided capital and labour
are not perfectly mobile, the main consequence of factor flows between regions
is to modify the rate at which regional economies converge to their steady-states.
For example, Shioji (2001) develops a growth model with exogenous public cap-
ital, and private capital that is mobile between regions but subject to adjustment
costs. This leads to a conditional convergence equation where the steady-state
depends on the equilibrium return to private capital, and the region’s stock of
public capital. This is a more detailed treatment than many in the literature, but
problems arise if workers and firms make location decisions based on the spa-
tial distribution of activity, or other characteristics of distinct locations. The logic
of a spatial equilibrium requires location decisions and growth to be analyzed
jointly, and the neoclassical growth model rules this out.
4.3 Growth with limited geography
Recent models of agglomeration and growth often imply a core-periphery struc-
ture, sometimes corresponding to a division between rural and urban regions.
This connects with an older class of models, the dual economy tradition, where
urban manufacturing and services coexist with rural agriculture. These models
have long been studied within development economics, and on the borders of
growth economics and trade theory. Historically, dual economy models have
been studied mainly in terms of comparative statics: for example, the effect of
a given productivity change, or factor accumulation, in changing the equilib-
rium.15 Recent work has given greater emphasis to structural transformation as
an ongoing, dynamic process. These models provide some insights into spatial
equilibrium and the relative growth of rural and urban regions; they also provide
a laboratory for developing some basic intuitions, before turning to richer mod-
els with more geographical content.
Strictly speaking, in the traditional approach to dual economies, the goods
of the respective sectors are labelled, but not the locations of consumption and
production, and firm location decisions are not modelled.16 In the newer models
15See Temple (2005) for a survey that emphasizes their empirical applications.
16In those dual economy models which incorporate migration costs for workers, it would often
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from economic geography, the core-periphery structure emerges endogenously.
In contrast, the older models can be seen as reduced forms, in which urban
locations happen to have substantial advantages.
Typically, the agricultural and urban sectors are each modelled as producing
an homogeneous good, under conditions of perfect competition. The relative
price of the agricultural good is either determined exogenously (by the world
prices facing a small open economy) or determined by utility maximization (in
a closed economy). Less often, the agricultural and urban goods are treated as
perfect substitutes. The location decisions of workers play a key role, so that
one endogenous variable is the allocation of workers across the two sectors, and
another is the equilibrium wage differential between the sectors/regions.
In the simple case where wages equal marginal products, and labour mobility
equalizes wages, this maximizes aggregate output, in the absence of externalities
or distortions. At the same time, the average product of labour will typically
differ across sectors; regional differences in average productivity are a condition
of efficiency rather than a sign of its absence. In richer dual economy models,
however, inefficiency can easily arise, and urban regions may be too small or too
large relative to rural regions.17
Some of the most interesting extensions to these models start with the urban
labour market. In the model of Harris and Todaro (1970), a fixed urban wage
leads to urban unemployment, and migration takes place unless expected util-
ities are equalized across the rural and urban sectors.18 In many dual economy
models with urban unemployment, productivity growth in the urban region will
induce a migration response that increases the number of urban unemployed —
the ‘Todaro paradox’. In contrast, productivity growth in the rural region will
increase rural wages and also relieve the pressure on cities, leading to better
outcomes in the urban labour market and smaller regional disparities.
An especially rich approach to dual economies has been developed by Lagakos
and Waugh (2013). They consider a general equilibrium Roy model, in which
heterogeneous workers sort across sectors according to their comparative ad-
vantage. One implication of a Roy model is that all but the marginal worker will
strictly prefer their current sector to the alternative. A calibrated version of the
model can explain a large wage gap between agricultural and non-agricultural
be most natural to interpret agricultural production as taking place at a single point, and urban
manufacturing and services production all taking place at another single point.
17Different versions of this can be seen in Graham and Temple (2006) and Satchi and Temple
(2009).
18Approaches with endogenous wages often have similar implications; see Bencivenga and
Smith (1997), Moene (1988) and Satchi and Temple (2009), among others.
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workers, without having to appeal to barriers to labour mobility, the traditional
approach in dual economy models. It can also explain why international vari-
ation in agricultural productivity is usually found to be much larger than inter-
national variation in non-agricultural productivity (Caselli 2005).
Even simple two-sector models demonstrate the importance of general equi-
librium reasoning, while allowing for multiple sources of growth. In most of the
models, the respective paths of rural and urban regions depend partly on rates
of technical progress, and partly on capital accumulation. The accumulation of
capital often leads to relative expansion of the sector/region which uses it more
intensively (usually, but not always, the urban region). For the basic 2× 2 model
of trade theory, with two goods and two factors, where the factors are both mo-
bile between sectors, this result is the standard Rybczynski effect. A version of
that effect reappears in models with alternative labour market assumptions, such
as the open economy version of the Harris-Todaro model studied by Corden and
Findlay (1975).
In recent years, attention has shifted to dynamic versions of these small-scale
general equilibrium models. These are to study structural transformation, and
primarily the shift out of agriculture, as part of a transition towards a balanced
growth path. Kongsamut et al. (2001) showed that this required strong assump-
tions that are unlikely to hold in practice. The approach of Ngai and Pissar-
ides (2007) shows how to combine differential productivity growth rates with a
balanced growth path, at the expense of restrictive assumptions on production
technologies. Their (closed economy) model can explain ongoing declines in
the relative price of the manufacturing good and the employment share of that
sector.
Other recent work has started to combine dual economy ideas with models
from urban and regional economics. Murata (2008) introduces a new mechanism
for structural transformation, which draws on the New Economic Geography
literature. In his model, a fall in transport costs increases the size of the market
for non-agricultural goods, and also - by lowering prices and raising real incomes
- prompts a demand shift towards non-agricultural goods. Henderson and Wang
(2005) construct a model of the rural-urban transformation which draws on dual
economy ideas, but extended to consider the endogenous evolution of distinct
cities, and allowing the formation of new cities. Michaels et al. (2012) study
the US evolution of populations in rural and urban areas from 1880 to 2000,
explaining the observed patterns partly in terms of structural transformation.
Rural-urban income differences can make a substantial contribution to over-
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all inequality.19 Dual economy models can be used to study this, and changes
in the relative productivity of different sectors as development proceeds. There
is long-standing evidence that structural change is associated with increases in
the relative labour productivity of agriculture; see, for example, Temple and
Woessmann (2006). Not all dual economy models readily generate this pattern,
which makes it a useful test. Gollin et al. (2004) argue that introducing home
production leads to a better explanation of the data. More broadly, one weak-
ness of dual economy models is that not much attention has been paid to the
modernization of agriculture; Yang and Zhu (2013) is a recent exception.
Although dual economy models have spatial implications, the locations are
only differentiated by rural or urban activity, which limits their usefulness for
understanding regional prosperity. The model of Gennaioli et al. (2013a) moves
further in the required direction: workers and firms have distinct addresses,
and decide where to locate. There are two possible types of region, productive
and unproductive; at each location, there is a fixed supply of land and housing,
and hence some part of the population remains in the less productive regions.
The regions all produce the same good, which is freely traded internally. A
key margin in the model is that especially able workers will self-select into en-
trepreneurship, and more able entrepreneurs run larger and more productive
firms. Relative to most dual economy models, this gives greater importance to
the stock of human capital, an idea that Gennaioli et al. investigate empirically.
But the tractability of the model inevitably comes at a price. Although locations
exist as discrete points with fixed stocks of land and housing, there is no role
for transport costs, and hence the model cannot explain the spatial correlation
of activity that is so apparent in the data.
Most dual economy models contrast agriculture with non-agriculture, but
the divergent paths of manufacturing and services are increasingly important,
for developing countries as well as developed. Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg
(2009) argue that the age of a sector matters for the dynamics of agglomera-
tion, defining a sector’s age as the time that has elapsed since the last major
innovation, such as electrification (for manufacturing) or IT (for services). In
its early stages, a major innovation will spur geographic concentration, because
knowledge spillovers are important as the technology is refined. But as fur-
ther development of the technology slows down, concentration gives way to
dispersion. Desmet et al. (2012) use this framework to analyze the evolution of
employment density across districts of India, where growth has been associated
19See Milanovic (2005a, 2005b) and Young (2013), among many others.
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with the rapid expansion of services in particular.
Much of the work discussed thus far originates in development econom-
ics. A parallel literature describes the interactions between growth and the size
distribution of cities, drawing on work in urban economics. In Eaton and Eck-
stein (1997) and Black and Henderson (1999), localized externalities sustain the
emergence of cities and generate increasing returns at the aggregate level, so
that agglomeration triggers growth. Gabaix (1999) and Eeckhout (2004) show
how models featuring exogenous localized growth and localized externalities
can generate the stable distribution of city sizes observed in the data. In particu-
lar, they seek to explain why the upper tail of the distribution is approximately
Pareto - so Zipf’s law holds - although both very small and very large cities are
systematically under-represented.
The ‘random growth’ approach, revived in the recent literature by Gabaix
(1999), starts with an initial arbitrary distribution of city sizes and lets each
city grow at an arbitrary mean rate, around which cities are hit by period-to-
period shocks. It then allows the cities to evolve freely and studies the conditions
under which their limit size distribution mimics the observed one. Eeckhout
(2004) assumes that total factor productivity in a city is determined by a positive
localized externality that increases with city size and an exogenous process of
localized technological change. In particular, letting Ai,t be the productivity
parameter reflecting the technological advancement of city i at time t, Eeckhout
assumes that the law of motion of Ai,t is given by Ai,t = Ai,t−1(1 + σi,t) with
each city experiencing an exogenous technology shock σi,t. City-specific shocks
are symmetric as well as identically and independently distributed with mean
zero and 1 + σi,t > 0. This law of motion implies that log(Ai,t) follows a unit
root process. There is clearly no growth in productivity in aggregate but, under
appropriate functional forms, the model converges to a long-run distribution
of city sizes whose upper tail is Pareto. City growth is proportionate, as also
observed in reality.
Here, growth determines agglomeration, but the growth process itself is
treated as exogenous. To fill this gap, Duranton (2007), Rossi-Hansberg and
Wright (2007) and Córdoba (2008) propose models that generate growth pro-
cesses consistent with specific features of the observed invariant distributions
of city sizes. In all three contributions, growth leads to agglomeration. Dur-
anton notes that it may be easier to match the city size distribution than it first
appears, suggesting more attention is needed to the empirical relevance of the
different possible mechanisms. Rossi-Hansberg and Wright address a particular
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conundrum for spatial theories of growth: the inherent tension between local
increasing returns, implied by the existence of cities, and aggregate constant
returns, implied by balanced growth. They show that variation in the urban
structure through the growth, birth, and death of cities can be seen as the mar-
gin that eliminates local increasing returns, to yield constant returns to scale in
the aggregate. Their model produces a distribution of city sizes that is consistent
with the real one, and whose dispersion is also consistent with the dispersion of
productivity shocks found in the data.
The close connection between these models and specific features of the data
is attractive. But their usefulness for studying regional growth is ultimately
constrained, because the models do not investigate how cities will be distributed
across space. As a result, key features of the observed geographical distribution
of economic activities, and their evolution through time, are absent.
4.4 Geography with limited growth
We now turn to more complex models, which draw heavily on ideas from inter-
national economics. The models we review are predominantly static. Neverthe-
less, it is often argued that static models can be used to understand the steady-
state implications of dynamic processes, otherwise too complex to analyze. In
the wake of a major change, such as a fall in transport costs or an improvement
in total factor productivity, the outcome of regional adjustment processes can be
understood in terms of the changing steady-state of a static model. We call this
approach ‘geography with limited growth’.
Traditionally, this approach has been the backbone of the economics of ag-
glomeration (Fujita and Thisse, 2002). These models address a fundamental
question: can economic interactions generate spatial patterns of activity that are
not determined solely by differences in exogenous fundamentals? Will asym-
metric patterns of activity emerge even when locations are symmetric? As dis-
cussed by Ottaviano and Thisse (2004), the fact that economic activities are un-
evenly distributed in space is hardly surprising, given that locations differ in
their climates, degrees of accessibility, and endowments of productive resources.
All these features can be classified under the common label of first nature. These
features have undoubtedly played an important role in explaining economic his-
tory, not least in the early stages of economic development. Exogenous spatial
heterogeneity is the cornerstone of neoclassical models of international trade,
and land use models in the tradition of von Thünen.
But another driving force of economic history has been the ongoing search
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for safe and cheap ways to move materials and products from one location to an-
other. One consequence is that the spatial distribution of economic activity will
not map directly against the spatial distribution of natural advantages. When
workers maximize utility and firms chase profits, this will generate endogenous
patterns of economic activity across space. This idea is captured by the concept
of second nature, the forms of economic geography that emerge as the outcome
of human actions. Modern theories of agglomeration study the relevant forces,
unveiling how spatial patterns of activity depend partly on exogenous spatial
heterogeneity, and partly on a range of other variables, not least transport costs.
Second nature geography is the outcome of an inherently dynamic process
but, as already noted, it can be understood partly by means of tractable static
models. At least since Marshall (1920), various second-nature forces have been
studied by economists, geographers and regional scientists, stemming from dif-
ferent types of localized technological and pecuniary externalities. For instance,
technological externalities associated with production are stressed by modern
urban economics, while pecuniary externalities associated with imperfect com-
petition are stressed by spatial competition theory and work in economic geo-
graphy (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2004).
The literature on these questions is vast, and a thorough assessment is bey-
ond the scope of this chapter. Extended discussions can be found in Fujita and
Thisse (2002), Combes, Mayer and Thisse (2008), Neary (2001), Prager and Thisse
(2012), and various volumes of the Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics.
Here we want to highlight the findings most relevant to understanding regional
prosperity. These can be summarized in terms of the so-called ‘spatial question’
in economic theory (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2001). This question has two sides,
one positive and one normative. On the positive side, the question at stake is
whether the agglomeration of economic activities can be explained in terms of
an explicitly-defined market mechanism. On the normative side, if observed pat-
terns of economic activity can be seen in terms of market outcomes, the question
at stake is whether such outcomes are likely to be efficient. The answers are ‘yes’
on the positive side and (usually) ‘no’ on the normative one. A range of models
link agglomeration and market forces, but typically these models are built on ex-
ternalities and distortions that lead to some degree of inefficiency (for example,
Ottaviano and Thisse 2005).
As discussed by Ottaviano and Thisse (2005), the relative importance of tech-
nological and pecuniary externalities depends on the spatial scale of the analysis.
According to Anas, Arnott and Small (1998), cities are replete with technological
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externalities. The same holds in local production systems (Pyke, Becattini and
Sengenberger, 1990). Besides local public goods, ‘communication externalities’
are of particular interest. These could be critical in services such as management,
administration, research, and finance. Knowledge, ideas and, above all, tacit in-
formation, can be considered as impure public goods that generate spillover
effects from one firm or organization to another. If economic agents possess
different pieces of information, pooling them through informal communication
channels can benefit many, hence the importance of proximity (Feldman, 1994).
Thus, to explain geographical clusters of somewhat limited spatial dimension,
such as cities and industrial districts, it seems reasonable to appeal to technolo-
gical externalities. In modelling terms, these can often be accommodated in the
competitive paradigm. Future work is likely to draw on the economics of net-
works, to consider the dissemination of information within and across regions.
But when one turns to a larger geographical scale, alternative mechanisms
come into play, and ones that are not easily accommodated in conventional gen-
eral equilibrium models. Direct physical contact seems unlikely to explain major
agglomerations such as the US manufacturing belt, or Western Europe’s con-
centration of economic activity along the ‘Hot Banana’ urban corridor, stretch-
ing from northern England to northern Italy. Instead, economists have sought
to explain large-scale agglomeration in terms of pecuniary externalities. These
arise from imperfect competition, in the presence of market-mediated linkages
between firms and consumers/workers. The relevant models are often grouped
under the banner of the New Economic Geography (NEG), which emerged in the
early 1990s. This approach draws heavily on analytical tools and ideas from the
theory of international trade (see, in particular, Helpman and Krugman, 1985).
These tools are used to study the movements of goods, services and factors
within countries, and to explain agglomeration as the outcome of endogenous
processes in which cumulative causation often plays a role.
This literature was founded by Krugman (1991), who develops a model in
which agglomeration arises through the mobility of labour. This mobility endo-
genously generates variations in market size that promote further agglomeration
since, in the presence of transport costs, firms want to locate near large markets.
Spatial agglomeration can also rise through input-output linkages, in which the
location choices of firms influence the size of the market for other firms and/or
input costs (Venables 1996). Some ideas have also been borrowed from urban
economics: congestion and rising land rents can be introduced to offset the in-
trinsic advantages of particular regions, as in Helpman (1998) and Gennaioli et
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al. (2013a), among others.
Endogenous agglomeration arises because mobile factors like to cluster, and
this can polarize the regional landscape between an active ‘core’, and a ‘peri-
phery’ in which immobile factors face lower real remuneration. The emergence
of a core-periphery structure typically depends on the level of trade frictions.
In the absence of congestion in the use of land or other non-tradable and non-
replicable resources, low trade frictions foster agglomeration, as immobile de-
mand in the periphery can be serviced from the core (Krugman, 1991; Krugman
and Venables, 1995). When congestion matters, the opposite is true: if trade
frictions are low, the high local cost of non-tradables pushes mobile factors away
from the core (Helpman, 1998). In the general case, agglomeration is more likely
to emerge for trade frictions that are neither too low nor too high (Puga, 1999;
Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002).20
Early NEG models were mainly aimed at explaining the ‘residual variation’
of economic activities across locations based on second nature forces, classified
as promoting either agglomeration or dispersion. Later models have increasingly
brought first nature into the picture. To see what might be learnt about regional
growth from this form of approach, we provide a quick sketch of the framework
used in Rice and Venables (2003).21 Assume two types of workers, skilled and
unskilled, each with Cobb-Douglas utility functions based on four goods —
housing, an international tradable good, a good that can be traded domestically
but not internationally (e.g., certain financial services) and a good that cannot
be traded domestically (e.g., restaurant meals or haircuts). The goods other than
housing are each produced using Cobb-Douglas technologies. The international
tradable, and the non-tradable, are treated as homogeneous, produced under
constant returns to scale and perfect competition. The nationally-traded good is
produced under monopolistic competition as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Finally,
assume that workers can freely move between cities. Other things equal, they
will migrate to cities with some intrinsic advantage, such as better amenities,
until the advantage is offset by higher commuting costs and higher land rents.
All rents are distributed to workers as a lump sum, in proportion to wages.
Under these assumptions, the prices of all goods are the same in all locations,
but the skill mix of the labour force in each city is indeterminate. Two cities with
20See Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-
Nicoud (2003), Ottaviano and Thisse (2004), and Combes, Mayer and Thisse (2008) for detailed
accounts of NEG models.
21See also Overman, Rice and Venables (2010), who develop a diagrammatic approach to
economic linkages across space.
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different relative endowments of skilled labour will produce different quantities
of the two traded goods, but have the same factor prices — a version of the factor
prize equalization theorem of trade theory, applied within a country. Cities may
then differ in terms of not only skill mix, but also in size and GDP per employee;
and many different configurations of these outcomes are possible. But in the
model, the free movement of labour implies that the utility of a given type of
worker must be the same in all locations. And since wages are equal across
locations, housing costs plus commuting costs must also be equal across cities.
In this case, cities that are relatively skill abundant and high income must also
be low density, so that the relatively high housing demand of skilled workers is
offset by lower commuting costs.
At first glance, there is no ‘regional problem’, because the mobility of labour
ensures that the utilities of a given type of worker are equalized across loca-
tions. But as new workers enter the labour force, the attainment of equilibrium
relies on migration: each new generation has to relocate to restore the balance
between the production structure of individual cities and their endowments of
skilled relative to unskilled labour. In a richer model, reallocations could involve
significant costs.
This simple setup has some counterfactual predictions: for example, the
model predicts a negative correlation between GDP per employee and dens-
ity, but the correlation in the data is often thought to be positive. A richer model
gives one city/region an intrinsic advantage that will make it larger in equilib-
rium, and introduces transport costs for the nationally-traded good, which is
assumed to be skill-intensive. The larger market of the dominant city makes
it a profitable location for the nationally-traded good, bidding up wages (and
GDP per employee) in the dominant city. Given transport costs, the price of the
nationally-traded good is lower in the dominant city, and workers are attracted
to the city by higher wages and lower prices, until these advantages are offset by
higher housing costs. Again, utilities are equalized in equilibrium, but changes
in underlying parameters, such as transport costs or the intrinsic advantages of
the dominant city, will generate population and asset price movements.
An alternative modification assumes that one city has a productivity advant-
age in the production of the (skill-intensive) international tradable; no transport
costs; and commuting costs that are equalized across cities. Now consider an
increase in the traded-sector productivity advantage of a dominant city. This
will raise wages in the dominant city, crowding out the nationally-traded sector,
and attracting workers until the high wages are fully offset by a higher price of
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the non-traded good and higher housing costs. This latter version of the model
generates positive correlations between density, GDP per employee, wages, av-
erage skills, price levels and housing costs, which may often be the empirically
relevant case. But there is no distinctively spatial pattern to the process of ag-
glomeration.
For now it is interesting to consider what has been learnt from the sketch
above. There may be disparities in skill endowments and GDP per employee
across regions, but regions that appear advantaged may also have higher hous-
ing costs and higher prices for goods that are not traded across regions. Utilities
are equalized in equilibrium by assumption. But spatial disparities continue
to have relevance for policy-makers, not least if there are costs of adjustment.
Changes in parameters — such as the productivity advantage of one city —
might induce a lengthy transition process that has relatively modest ultimate be-
nefits. In a numerical example in Rice and Venables (2003), a relatively modest
change in traded-sector productivity can generate large population movements.
This process of transition and adjustment may be associated with equilibrium
utility levels that are only modestly higher than before. It is noteworthy that, in
a quantitative exercised based on US data, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013a)
find a similar result: eliminating differences in productivity or amenities across
US cities would lead to major population movements, but modest welfare gains.
For China, the welfare gains are estimated to be larger by an order of magnitude.
To date, the literature on geography and trade is long on models that study
the mechanics of agglomeration in abstract landscapes, but remains short on the
development of realistic quantitative versions of those models. This is largely
because of their complexity, which often restricts the analysis to a small number
of symmetric regions. Recent studies have started to fill this gap. In so doing,
they have borrowed from the new literature on international trade in which the
cross-country productivity distribution is endogenous; the literature reveals new
sources of gains from trade under perfect competition (Eaton and Kortum, 2002)
and imperfect competition (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum, 2003; Melitz,
2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).22
A recent example of this work is Donaldson (2010), who develops a Ricardian
trade model to study the effects of the Indian railway network, introduced by
the British when India was under colonial rule. The model draws on Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and features many regions, many commodities, and costly trade.
22For a discussion of these new sources of gains from trade see Arkolakis, Costinot and
Rodríguez-Clare (2012) and Melitz and Redding (2013).
31
Regions are assumed to have different productivity levels across commodities,
generating opportunities to exploit comparative advantage through trade. When
two regions become linked by a railway, their bilateral trade cost falls and this
allows for specialization according to comparative advantage. The empirical
implementation of the model allows Donaldson (2010) to quantify the extent
to which the railway network improved India’s trading environment, in terms
of lower trade costs, smaller inter-regional price gaps, and larger trade flows
between regions and internationally. Further, he also investigates how much of
the estimated reduced-form welfare gains plausibly arise from newly exploited
gains from trade. In particular, he finds that those gains account for virtually all
of the observed reduced-form impact of railways on real income estimated from
the data.
More generally, Redding (2012) also develops a tractable model of regional
economic geography based on Eaton and Kortum (2002), suitable for quantitat-
ive investigations. He studies the general equilibrium of an economy with an
arbitrary number of regions connected by an arbitrary pattern of geographical
trade costs, modelled as iceberg transport costs that may differ between all bi-
lateral pairs of regions. Labour is assumed to be mobile across regions. The
productivity level of each region is drawn from a Fréchet distribution. Regions
with higher productivity pay higher wages, which attracts population until the
higher wages are offset by higher living costs. Regions with good market access
(low transport costs) will have low prices for traded goods, and again this is off-
set by population movements that drive up housing costs. Hence, in equilibrium,
welfare is equalized across locations, but regions that are productive or well situ-
ated have higher nominal wages, larger populations and higher housing costs.
The model is especially well-suited for studying the effects on regional growth of
an economy-wide trade liberalization, or more generally, a fall in external trade
costs. A liberalization of trade will lead to an endogenous internal reallocation
of population, implying a combination of regional growth and regional decline.
An alternative vein of research gives more attention to the relationship between
first nature geography and the decisions of mobile, and heterogeneous, people
and firms under imperfect competition. Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) provide a basis for this class of models. A key distinction is whether the
heterogeneous characteristics of agents are assumed to be revealed to them be-
fore, or after, their location decisions. Sorting models study how heterogeneous
agents, aware of their characteristics ex ante, will sort themselves into locations
of varying sizes (Nocke, 2006; Baldwin and Okubo, 2006; Davis and Dingel,
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2012; Okubo, Picard and Thisse, 2010; Picard and Okubo, 2012).23 In contrast,
selection models study what happens when heterogeneity materializes ex post,
after agents have already committed to their locations: they can then self-select
across whatever economic activities are available in those locations.
Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2012) present a selection model where ex ante
identical individuals decide whether to move from a common rural hinterland to
cities. Their heterogeneity is revealed after this decision has been made, and the
decision itself is assumed to be irreversible, which rules out sorting. They show
that larger market size increases productivity partly through a finer division of
labour driven by pecuniary externalities (richer availability of intermediates) and
partly through a selection process. Meanwhile, higher productivity increases
market size by providing incentives for rural-urban migration. Behrens, Dur-
anton and Robert-Nicoud (2010) analyze both sorting and selection in a model
where agglomeration is driven by technological externalities. They distinguish
between ex ante heterogenity (‘talent’), known to agents before they decide where
to locate, and ex post heterogeneity (‘luck’), revealed to agents after their location
decisions have been made. Agents choose locations based on their talent, while
luck influences subsequent occupational choices. More talented agents stand a
better chance of finding more productive occupations in larger locations; this
complementarity between talent and market size leads to the sorting of more
talented agents into larger markets. Then, more demanding selection in more
talented locations implies that average productivity is higher in these locations.
Higher productivity, in turn, complements the agglomeration benefits of larger
locations, and so markets with greater concentrations of talent are larger in equi-
librium. Markups are constant, as in Melitz (2003). This implies that, conditional
on sorting and agglomeration, selection becomes independent of market size.
Similarly to Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2012), Ottaviano (2012) dispenses
with ex ante heterogeneity (and first nature asymmetries) in order to investigate
how firm heterogeneity influences the aggregate balance between agglomera-
tion and dispersion forces, in the presence of pecuniary externalities. This is
a selection model based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). A further departure
from the analysis of Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2012) is that the model al-
lows location decisions to be reversible, and whether regions are characterized
as ‘urban’ or ‘rural’ is determined endogenously by those decisions.24 The emer-
23While other papers focus on firm heterogeneity on the supply side, in terms of productivity,
the distinctive feature of Picard and Okubo (2012) is their study of heterogeneity on the demand
side, in terms of tastes.
24Behrens, Mion, Murata and Südekum (2011) take a similar approach in their study of spatial
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gence of agglomeration is driven by pecuniary rather than technological extern-
alities. Markups are determined endogenously with larger market size leading
to lower markups. This implies that, differently from Behrens, Duranton and
Robert-Nicoud (2010) but as in Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2012), selection is
still more demanding in larger markets, even after conditioning out sorting and
agglomeration.
Combes et al. (2012) also extend the model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) to
allow for agglomeration economies driven by technological externalities. They
estimate the relative importance of selection and agglomeration in determining
the spatial distribution of firm productivity levels. Following Melitz and Ottavi-
ano (2008), they rule out labour mobility across locations, although extensions to
the basic framework can be made.25 To distinguish between agglomeration and
selection effects, they nest a generalized version of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
and a model of agglomeration in the spirit of Fujita and Ogawa (1982) and Lu-
cas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002). In larger (more dense) locations, the firm pro-
ductivity distribution is left-truncated due to more demanding selection, but also
right-shifted and dilated due to agglomeration. Combes et al. (2012) show how
to estimate these effects by studying how the quantiles of the log productivity
distribution in a large city will be related to the quantiles of the log productivity
distribution in a small city. They estimate the relationship from data on French
employment areas, and find no difference in the left-truncation of the log pro-
ductivity distribution between dense and less dense areas. This suggests that the
firm selection mechanism cannot explain spatial productivity differences across
these areas. As they acknowledge, this result might not generalize to countries
that are less well integrated than France, or where firms charge prices that differ
across locations. Even for the French case, it does not rule out selection effects
altogether, since their intensity could be the same across locations.
frictions, allowing for the joint determination of location sizes, productivity levels, markups,
wages, consumption diversity, and the number and size distribution of firms.
25In a separate online appendix (http://diegopuga.org/papers/selectagg_webapp.pdf), they
show how their model can be extended to include worker mobility, consumption amenities, and
urban crowding costs, without affecting the key equilibrium equations on which their empirical
analysis is based. They restrict their attention to a situation in which there exists a unique
stable spatial equilibrium with (asymmetric) dispersion. In contrast to Ottaviano (2012), whether
heterogeneity fosters agglomeration or dispersion is beyond the scope of their paper.
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5 Geography and growth
We now consider growth models that make space for space: dynamic models of
the growth process in which space plays a determining role. We have labelled
this the ‘hard problem’ of regional economics. Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012a, p. 2-3) provide a clear statement of the problem:
Incorporating a continuum of locations into a dynamic framework is
a challenging task for two reasons: it increases the dimensionality
of the problem by requiring agents to understand the distribution of
economic activity over time and over space, and clearing goods and
factor markets is complex because prices depend on trade and mo-
bility patterns. These two difficulties typically make spatial dynamic
models intractable, both analytically and numerically.
One reason the problem becomes intractable is that, if we think of a dynamic
model as one with forward-looking investment decisions, then agents must an-
ticipate the solutions for future prices, and hence the equilibrium patterns of
trade and mobility, at all future dates. As Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg note, the
only way forward is to simplify the problem. Our review distinguishes between
two families of models, dynamic NEG models and dynamic ‘sequential market
clearing’ (SMC) models. These vary in whether locations are ordered in space
as in the real world. Though the task of combining agglomeration forces with
interesting long-run dynamics and growth paths is far from complete, these two
families of models represent the current frontier of theoretical research on re-
gional growth. With this in mind, we set the ideas out in detail.
5.1 Non-ordered space
We first consider non-ordered space. An influential literature in trade theory
has developed dynamic models with two or more countries. The relevant con-
tributions include Grossman and Helpman (1991), Young (1991), Ventura (1997),
Eaton and Kortum (1999), and Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2007). In these models,
either autarky is compared to free trade or, when trade costs are introduced,
countries are not ordered in space. From the viewpoint of spatial economics,
the most attractive members of this family are the dynamic versions of NEG
models. These typically feature a small number of locations (in most cases only
two) that exchange goods and ideas in the presence of frictions. In the wake
of Krugman (1991), localized pecuniary externalities drive the agglomeration of
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production. Endogenous growth is introduced by adding innovation in product
variety with technological externalities, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991).
The localized nature of these externalities, due to frictions in the exchange of
ideas between regions, drive the agglomeration of innovation and can lead to
cumulative causation in the location of production and innovation.
Baldwin and Martin (2004) survey several different specifications of these
models and tease out their main insights. Cumulative causation implies the joint
agglomeration of innovation and production. Aggregate growth is then driven
by factor accumulation in a small subset of regions. This leads to ‘growth poles’
and ‘growth sinks’. However, due to the localized nature of the technological
externalities in innovation, the endogenous emergence of regional disparities is
accompanied by faster aggregate growth and higher welfare in all regions.
Minerva and Ottaviano (2009) present a simple unifying model with two
regions that encompasses a variety of insights from this line of research in a
parsimonious way. It highlights the implications of geography for the dynamic
process of regional growth. In this model, the geographical element arises partly
due to costs of trading goods across regions (‘transport costs’) and partly from
barriers to exchanging ideas (‘communication costs’). The model illustrates how
agglomeration and growth can reinforce each other, giving rise to the cumulative
causation that Myrdal envisaged.
An important limitation should be acknowledged at the outset, which is that
the model rules out labour mobility across regions. Relaxing this assumption is
not straightforward, as we discuss later. It has been relaxed in an alternative class
of models, based on sequential market clearing. These models, reviewed later,
can accommodate labour mobility, congestion in land use and a large number of
regions, without sacrificing analytical tractability. At the same time, the account
of growth in such models tends to be more stylized than the one we describe
here.
Following Minerva and Ottaviano (2009), let us assume that there are two
regions, North and South. To abstract from first nature, the exogenous attributes
of the two regions are the same. First, they are populated by an identical number
Q of geographically immobile workers. As each worker supplies one unit of
labour inelastically, Q is also the regional endowment of labour. Second, regions
are endowed with an identical initial stock of knowledge capital K0. Through
time, profit-seeking R&D laboratories create additional knowledge capital that
is freely mobile between regions. In so doing, they finance their investments
through bonds, with riskless return r(t) at time t, sold to workers in a perfect
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inter-regional capital market. Henceforth, in the presentation of the model we
will focus on North. Analogous expressions will apply to South.
Transport costs and localized spillovers play a key role in the analysis. Work-
ers consume two goods, a homogeneous ‘traditional’ good Y and a horizontally

















, σ > 1 (3)
where Di(t) is the consumption of variety i and N(t) the total number of variet-
ies in the economy.
Given a unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution, intertemporal utility





= r(t)− ρ (4)
where E(t) is individual expenditure. The Cobb-Douglas instantaneous utility
function is then maximized when the shares α and 1− α of individual expendit-
ures E(t) are allocated to the consumption of the modern and traditional goods
respectively. In turn, the fraction αE(t) is distributed across the varieties of the













so that σ measures both the own- and the cross-price elasticities of demand.
The production of the traditional good is characterized by perfect competi-
tion and constant returns to scale with labour as its only input. An appropriate
choice of units means that the unit labour requirement can be set to 1. This im-
plies that the profit-maximizing price of Y equals the wage. The traditional good
is assumed to be freely traded between and within regions. Hence, both its price
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and the wage are equalized across regions. Selecting good Y as the numéraire
pins down the common wage to 1.
The production of the modern varieties is characterized by monopolistic com-
petition and increasing returns to scale. These arise from the presence of a fixed
cost incurred in terms of one unit of knowledge capital per variety. Variable costs
are incurred, instead, in terms of β units of labour per unit of output. Due to the
fixed capital requirement, at any instant t the total number of varieties available
in the economy is determined by the aggregate knowledge capital stock Kw(t).
In equilibrium there is a one-to-one relation between firms and varieties, and so
the total number of firms N(t) is equal to Kw(t). In turn, due to the free mobility
of knowledge capital, the entry decisions of firms will determine where varieties
are actually produced, and we use n(t) to denote the number of Northern firms
and varieties. Entry is free, and at any given instant there are many potential
entrants. These need knowledge capital to start producing. In the presence of a
capital supply that is fixed at any given instant, competitive bidding by entrants
transfers all operating profits to capital owners.
Geography is introduced in the product market, by assuming that trade flows
of differentiated varieties face iceberg transport costs, within and between re-
gions. The size of the internal transport costs differs across regions: in North
and South, firms have to ship τN > 1 and τS > 1 units respectively, in order
to deliver one unit to their domestic customers. As for inter-regional trade, the
delivery of one unit requires the shipment of τR > 1 units, regardless of the
direction of trade. Within-region shipments are less costly than inter-regional
ones, and this cost advantage is more pronounced for North. Hence, we have
τN < τS < τR. This ranking of the transport cost parameters identifies North as
the developed ‘core’ and South as the developing ‘periphery’.
All firms in both markets face the same constant elasticity of demand σ
and the same marginal production cost β. Hence, profit maximization leads
to the same producer price (‘mill price’) for all firms as a constant markup
over marginal cost p = σβ/(σ − 1). The corresponding consumer prices (‘de-
livered prices’) simply reflect differential transport costs: pN = p τN, pS = p τS,
pR = p τR. With these prices, operating profits are pi(t) = βx(t)/(σ− 1). Here
x(t) denotes firm output inclusive of the quantity lost in transit, and the price
index (6) can be rewritten as P(t) = pN(t)
1
1−σ [δNγ(t) + δR(1− γ (t))]
1
1−σ , where
γ(t) = n(t)/N(t) is the share of firms located in North and N(t) = Kw(t) is
the total number of firms as well as the total stock of knowledge capital. The
parameters δN ≡ (τN)1−σ, δS ≡ (τS)1−σ and δR ≡ (τR)1−σ measure the efficiency
38
of internal and external transportation with 0 < δR < δS < δN < 1.
The national capital stock Kw(t) is accumulated through profit-seeking R&D
by perfectly-competitive laboratories facing constant returns to scale. Know-
ledge spillovers are assumed to increase the productivity of researchers as know-
ledge accumulates, and this sustains growth in the long run. Geography is intro-
duced in the knowledge capital market through a specification of the R&D tech-
nology that encompasses both localized knowledge spillovers (Martin and Ot-
taviano, 1999) and intermediate business services (Martin and Ottaviano, 2001)












K(t) ≡ dK(t)/dt is the flow of knowledge created at time t, QI(t) is labour
employed in R&D, D(t) is the basket of business services, and ε ∈ (0, 1) is the
share of business services in R&D. Note that the basket of business services is
assumed to be the same as the consumption basket, for analytical convenience.
In (7) A(t) refers to the North’s total factor productivity in R&D and is assumed
to be an increasing function of the total stock of knowledge Kw(t) as embodied
in the operations of modern producers. Specifically, the region-specific level
of productivity in R&D is given by A(t) = A Kw(t)µ [ωNγ(t) +ωR(1− γ(t))]µ,
where A is a positive constant. Here µ ∈ (0, 1) measures the intensity of the
knowledge spillovers, whose geographical diffusion is hampered by frictional
communication costs. Their spatial decay is regulated by the ω’s. It is assumed
to be steeper between regions than within them, and steeper in South than in
North, reflecting their different development stages. Hence 0 < ωR < ωS <
ωN < 1. The larger ω, the lower the corresponding communication costs.
Both transport and communication costs create an incentive for innovation to
cluster where production also disproportionately happens. To see this, we can
use profit maximizing prices and the equilibrium wage to compute the marginal






N(t) [ωNγ(t) +ωR(1− γ(t))]1−
ε




where η = pε/A is a positive constant, and we have imposed the constraint
µ+ ε/(σ− 1) = 1 so that in the long run the economy follows a balanced growth
path. This constraint preserves the incentive to invest in R&D in the long run, as
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the marginal cost of innovation decreases over time at the same rate as its benefit
measured by the value of a firm.
Inspecting (8) reveals that, given the rankings of ω’s and δ’s, the marginal cost
of innovation is lower in North provided it hosts a larger number of firms. As we
will see, this is indeed the case in equilibrium, as lower internal transport costs
increase the size of the local market. Hence, due to perfect competition among
laboratories, in equilibrium they will all be located in North. Even though long-
run growth is entirely driven by Northern innovators, they are still financed in
the inter-regional capital market by both Northern and Southern workers. This
implies that, in equilibrium, the value v(t) of a unit of knowledge capital has
to satisfy an arbitrage condition. It requires the bond yield r(t) to be equal
to the percentage return on investment in knowledge capital, consisting of the
percentage capital gain
.









where v(t) = F(t) as, due to perfect competition in R&D, profit-maximizing
laboratories price knowledge capital at marginal cost.
Finally, the model is closed by imposing that in equilibrium product and la-
bour markets clear. Consider the product market first. Substituting the profit
maximizing prices into demands (5) allows us to state the market-clearing con-
























where an asterisk flags Southern variables. Only Northern demand is augmen-
ted by intermediate expenditures εF(t)
.
N(t) as R&D is active only in North.
Turning to the labour market, this clears when the total endowment of labour
2Q is fully employed in innovation QI(t) = (1− ε)F(t)
.
N(t), in modern produc-






, and in traditional production










We now study agglomeration and growth. The market clearing conditions
for products and labour can be used to highlight how growth affects location
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and, vice versa, location affects growth. We focus on a balanced growth path





N(t)/N(t). Constant expenditures imply
.
E = 0 so that,
given (4), we have r = ρ. Further, FN and γ are constant, and hence the evolution
of the value of knowledge capital is determined by the growth rate of knowledge





−g. In other words, the marginal benefit of innovation (v) and its marginal cost
(F) both fall at the same constant rate.
The arbitrage condition (9) implies that, in equilibrium, all firms achieve the
same level of profits and hence the same scale of output wherever they are. Then
we can use (10) to determine this common output scale as
x = [(σ− 1) /βσ] [(2αEQ + εFNg) /N] (12)
This can be used to rewrite (9) as a function of E, g and FN. The resulting
expression can be solved together with labour market clearing (11) to show that,
in equilibrium, expenditure equals permanent income:
2EQ = 2Q + ρFN (13)








Substituting (8) into (14) shows that location affects growth through the mar-









σ−1 [δNγ+ δR(1− γ)]
ε
σ−1 − ρσ− α
σ− ε (15)
In particular, more agglomeration in North makes innovation less costly and
hence leads to faster growth.
The joint solution of the product market clearing conditions (10) determines








δR (δN − δS)
(δN − δR) (δS − δR) +
δNδS − δ2R






In (16) θ = (αEQ + εFNg) / (2αEQ + εFNg) is the Northern share of expendit-
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ures in the modern sector, after taking into account that E = E∗ since regions
share the same initial endowments. It depends on the endogenous variables E,
FN and g. However, using (14) it can be expressed as a function of g only, thus
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This shows that growth affects location through its influence on the Northern share
of expenditures. In particular, faster growth increases the Northern expenditure
share as innovation takes place only in North, which leads more firms to locate
there.
Expressions (15) and (17) highlight a crucial result: agglomeration (larger γ)
and growth (larger g) are jointly determined. Although the two do not inter-
act dynamically, this can still be seen as a form of cumulative causation: forces
which promote growth indirectly promote agglomeration, and vice versa. The
outcome is a trade-off for policy-makers, between promoting growth and redu-
cing regional disparities. Further insights into the role of geography are readily
gained by focusing on two extreme cases that arise when the cost of innovation
is determined by communication costs only (ε = 0) or by transport costs only
(ε = σ− 1) as in Martin and Ottaviano (1999) and Martin and Ottaviano (2001)
respectively. If ε = 0, lower communication costs within North foster growth but
have no impact on agglomeration. The same applies to lower inter-regional com-
munication costs. In contrast, lower communication costs in South have no im-
pact as long as no innovation takes place there. Moreover, changes in transport
costs affect location, but have no impact on growth. If ε = σ− 1, reductions in
inter-regional and intra-North transport costs promote agglomeration in North
as well as growth; reductions in intra-South transport costs promote relocation
from North to South, but also hamper growth.
As we noted previously, this analysis has ruled out labour mobility, which
is hard to accommodate in multi-region endogenous growth models. In prin-
ciple, mobility could be introduced as in Fujita and Thisse (2003) but, absent
congestion in land use, this would simply lead to the clustering of all factors in
a single region. In principle, allowing for congestion in land use could avoid
this outcome, but leads to a model that is analytically intractable. Studies that
allow for labour mobility in a multi-region endogenous growth model, under
perfect foresight, include Walz (1996) and Baldwin and Forslid (2000). As dis-
cussed by Fujita and Thisse (2002), the assumption of costless migration in Walz
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(1996) leads to bang-bang behaviour that does not accord with reality. Migration
is gradual in Baldwin and Forslid (2003), at the expense of analytical complex-
ity. For reasons of tractability, Fujita and Thisse (2003) focus on a steady-state
equilibrium in which the spatial distribution of skilled workers is time-invariant.
Although they provide a stability analysis, the details of the transition process
are not studied.
5.2 Ordered space
Dynamic NEG models enhance our understanding of the common forces un-
derlying growth and agglomeration. As argued by Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg
(2010), however, their focus on a small number of locations misses the richness
of the observed geography of economic activities, and limits their empirical ap-
plications. Generalizing them to more than a few regions introduces problems
of analytical tractability, especially when one allows for frictions in the mobility
of capital (Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano, 2001) or labour (Fujita and Thisse,
2003). Some progress could still be made through numerical methods, as shown
by Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) for static models in a continuous space,
but work in this vein remains limited.
A small number of papers study a fully dynamic setup with a continuum
of locations: these include Brito (2004), Brock and Xepapadeas (2008, 2009) and
Boucekkine, Camacho and Zou (2009). They typically focus on the allocation
problem of a social planner but, absent more structure, it is hard to extract
general insights. The main problem is that, in order to make decisions, forward-
looking agents need to understand the whole distribution of economic activities
over space and time implied by each feasible action.
Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2010, 2012a) advance an alternative approach,
initially proposed in Rossi-Hansberg (2005), that is analytically tractable when
space is continuous and one-dimensional. To reduce the complexity of the prob-
lem, they model a situation in which agents do not have to consider the future
allocation paths, because these paths are beyond their control and do not affect
their returns from current decisions. Hence, though forward-looking, agents
solve static problems. This is achieved by imposing enough structure on the
diffusion of technology or on the mobility of agents and the way property rights
over land are allocated among them. This approach generates a dynamic process
in which locations continuously change in occupational structure and employ-
ment density, but the aggregate economy converges to a balanced growth path.
In a simplified version of their model, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2010)
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study an economy in which all markets are perfectly competitive; locations ac-
cumulate technology by investing in innovation in one homogeneous-good in-
dustry and by receiving spillovers from other locations; factor mobility is fric-
tionless; and trade is the result of agents holding a diversified portfolio of land
across locations. Land is given by the unit interval [0, 1], time is discrete and
total population is L. The one-dimensional space [0, 1] is divided in connected
intervals (‘counties’), each administered by a local government.












= p(l, t)c(l, t)∀l, t
where U (c(l, t)) is the instantaneous utility of consumption c(l, t) in period t, β
is the discount factor, and E is the expectation operator. Consumption incurs a
price p(l, t). Income consists of the wage w(l, t) and the share 1/L of total land
rent R(t) under the assumption that consumers hold a fully-diversified portfolio
of land across locations. Due to free labour mobility, in each period t, utility is
the same everywhere.
Production employs labour and land with technology:
x (L(l, t)) = Z(l, t)L(l, t)µ
where x (L(l, t)) is output per unit of land, Z(l, t) is total factor productivity and
L(l, t) is employment per unit of land with µ ∈ (0, 1). The profit maximization
problem of a firm can be stated as:
max
L(l,t)
(1− τ(l, t)) [p (l, t) Z(l, t)L(l, t)µ − w(l, t)L(l, t)]
where τ(l, t) is a tax on profits, levied by the local government of the county to
which location l belongs, in order to finance investment in process innovation
leading to an improved level of total factor productivity equal to zlZ(l, t).
In particular, the local government can buy a probability φ ∈ [0, 1] of in-
novating at a cost ψ(φ) per unit of land proportional to wages, with ψ′(φ) > 0
and ψ′′(φ) > 0. Successful innovation allows the government to draw zl from a
Pareto distribution with c.d.f. F(z) = 1− z−a with z ≥ 1. Under the assumption








a− 1 p(l, t)Z(l, t)L(l, t)
µdl − Iψ(φ(l, t)) (18)
where ψ(φ(l, t)) is government investment in location l at time t, φ(l, t) is the
probability that the government gets to draw from F(z) in location l at time t,
1/(a− 1) is the expected value of the total factor productivity gain for location
l at time t conditional on the government getting to draw from F(z) in that
location. In other words, the local government spends on R&D to maximize
the expected increase in the output value of its county net of the investment
cost. The fact that the maximization problem (18) is static follows from a key
assumption on the diffusion of innovation, which makes the best technology
available to all neighbouring locations with a one-period delay with respect to
the innovator. Matched with the assumption that counties are small, the one-
period delay implies that a county’s innovation decision today does not affect
its expected level of technology tomorrow. Interestingly, (18) exhibits a scale
effect as high-price, high-productivity and high-employment density locations
will optimally innovate more.
As in the dynamic NEG framework presented earlier, Desmet and Rossi-
Hansberg (2010) introduce geography through communication and transport
frictions that hamper the geographical mobility of goods and ideas. For ideas, at
time t, before the innovation decision, location l has access to the best spatially
discounted technology available of the previous period, so ex ante Z(l, t) equals:
Z−(l, t) = max
r∈[0,1]
e−δ|l−r|Z(r, t− 1)
where δ > 0 measures the steepness of the spatial decay of diffusion. Based
on this technology consumers costlessly relocate, which ensures that utility is
the same across all locations, and wages are set. The fact that consumers hold
fully-diversified portfolios of land in all locations implies that they need not
be forward-looking when deciding where to locate. After consumers move,
counties invest in innovation, and production takes place using the new tech-
nology Z+(l, t) so that ex post Z(l, t) equals Z+(l, t). Due to land portfolio di-
versification, rents are redistributed from high-productivity to low-productivity
locations, which therefore run trade surpluses and deficits respectively. Turning
to the product market, transport costs again take the iceberg form: if one unit of
the good is shipped from l to r, only eκ|l−r| units reach their destination. Hence,
with perfect competition we have p(r, t) = e−κ|l−r|p(l, t).
In equilibrium labour and product markets clear. In the case of labour, at
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each point in time the market clearing condition is:
∫ 1
0
L(l, t)dl = L
The market clearing condition in the product market is less straightforward.
Following Rossi-Hansberg (2005), it is stated sequentially. In particular, one can
start at one end of the one-dimensional space interval and accumulate produc-
tion minus consumption in a given market (properly discounted by transport
costs) until one reaches the other end of the interval. At the boundary, for
markets to clear, ‘excess supply’ has to be equal to zero. Formally, let H(l, t)
define the stock of excess supply accumulated from location 0 to location l. By




= x(l, t)− c(l, t)L(l, t)− κ |H(l, t)|
where x(l, t) = x(L(l, t)− ψ(l, t)/p(l, t), t) so that, at each location, we add to
the stock of excess supply the amount of local output and subtract the amount
of local consumption. We then need to adjust for the fact that if |H(l, t)| is not
zero and we increase l, we have to ship the stock of excess supply over a longer
distance. This implies a per-unit cost in terms of the good equal to κ due to the
iceberg transport costs. In the end, the good market clears if H(1, t) = 0.
At any period t the instantaneous equilibrium of this economy can be com-
puted easily. Before innovation takes place, workers decide where to live. Al-
though the realizations of innovation are random, counties are small, so that
there is no aggregate uncertainty. This allows workers to anticipate prices cor-
rectly. In addition, workers observe wages and land rents. Once innovation is
realized, one can compute actual production, actual distributed land rents and
trade. The resulting prices should then be consistent with those used by workers
when they decided where to live. Since decisions depend only on current out-
comes, computing an equilibrium involves solving a functional fixed point each
period. The dynamic growth process is determined by the sequence of those
static points.
As usual, the spatial distribution of producers and workers results from the
balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces. The diffusion of tech-
nology promotes agglomeration, as high levels of local employment raise the
incentives to innovate. Due to spatial decay in the diffusion of innovation, pro-
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ductivity is higher in locations close to high-employment clusters, which attracts
employment and fosters more innovation. This agglomeration force is opposed
by local congestion, as employment density reduces labour productivity. This
arises because, with constant returns to labour and land, and given that land
cannot be accumulated locally, there are local diminishing returns to labour.
This form of local congestion tends to spread employment across locations given
identical technology levels.
Growth is linked to geography because more uniform, but weaker, incentives
to innovate are associated with dispersion, whereas agglomeration is associated
with fewer, but more active, innovation centres. As a result, when activity is
spatially dispersed, innovation relies more on the extensive margin (how many
locations innovate) whereas the intensive margin (how much each location in-
novates) plays a key role when activity is agglomerated. Easier diffusion makes
the extensive margin less important and aggregate growth is generally higher
with agglomeration.
Growth is also higher for higher transport costs, as these lead to more con-
centrated production. In this respect, higher transport costs entail static losses
but dynamic gains, through more agglomeration and thus innovation. This is
different from the NEG framework discussed earlier, in which higher transport
costs promote dispersion and slower growth. The difference is explained by the
fact that Minerva and Ottaviano (2009) do not model locally non-reproducible
land, so that no congestion arises from its use. This parallels the opposite pre-
dictions of the static models of Krugman (1991) and Helpman (1998) discussed
earlier in the chapter.
The model of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) implies that the concen-
tration of employment in neighbouring locations leads to more innovation and
faster growth. This effect is due to local density in a given location, and diffu-
sion from locally dense neighbours. Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2012a) present
a more general version of their framework in which two industries, manufac-
turing and services, interact because of trade. This extension reveals another
channel through which agglomeration and growth are connected. Due to per-
fect competition, locations specialized in manufacturing exhibit higher producer
(‘mill’) prices of services. This happens because low transport costs in serving
local consumers in the manufacturing cluster allow service providers in those
locations to remain competitive in terms of customer (‘delivered’) prices, despite
higher producer prices. Manufacturing clusters will therefore have an incentive
to import services from other locations. Their demand for imported services
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will, however, fall with distance due to growing transport costs, so that locations
closer to manufacturing clusters will tend to have higher employment, higher
prices and greater innovation in services. Accordingly, the co-agglomeration of
different industries is an additional source of local growth and innovation. This
trade channel works on top of diffusion, and is reminiscent of the distinction
between transport and communication costs drawn by Martin and Ottaviano
(1999, 2001) in their dynamic NEG models.
In a quantitative exercise, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2012a) show that their
model can help to explain the evolution of the US economy over the last half-
century. In particular, it can generate the reduction in the manufacturing em-
ployment share, the increased spatial concentration of services, the growth in
service productivity starting in the mid-1990s, the rise in the dispersion of land
rents in the same period, and several other spatial and temporal patterns.
In contrast to the model we presented above, where innovation is decided by
local governments, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2012a) explicitly model innov-
ation as the outcome of firms making profit-maximizing choices. To produce,
firms need to compete for non-replicable land. Since innovation can increase
the productivity of that non-replicable land, firms realize they can enhance their
bid for land by innovating. As a result, firms may optimally choose to innov-
ate, in spite of the market being perfectly competitive and all profits being bid-
den away through land rents. The role of land in generating innovation in a
perfectly competitive environment is discussed in further detail in Desmet and
Rossi-Hansberg (2012b).
Moreover, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2012a) show how the reallocation
of employment toward services ultimately accelerates innovation in some loca-
tions specializing in services; from then onwards, service productivity increases
together with manufacturing productivity, leading to a balanced growth path.
Hence, their model is a full-fledged endogenous growth model with spatial
heterogeneity, and one that can accommodate both structural transformation
and a balanced growth path. The methods that Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg
(2010, 2012a) use to deal with growth in an ordered geographical space are fairly
straightforward to apply, relative to the underlying complexity of the problem.
However, they can only be used in one-dimensional (or two-dimensional and
symmetric) compact geographical spaces, and extending this approach to non-
symmetric two-dimensional space would be a challenge.
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6 Regional prosperity: data and methods
A common thread runs through many of the models we have considered: what
happens at each location is a function of the outcomes and characteristics of all
other locations. This raises a formidable identification problem for empirical
researchers who want to isolate causal mechanisms, and the available empir-
ical methods differ in how persuasively they achieve this. This section will first
discuss the available data, and then some leading methods. Some of the most
important studies are based on natural experiments, with estimates often ob-
tained by difference-in-differences; since these methods are well known, we do
not cover them in detail. For an extended discussion of the natural experiment
approach in regional economics, see Holmes (2010). Some examples, and dis-
cussion, can be found in Diamond and Robinson (2010).
6.1 Data
Historically, one obstacle to work on regional growth has been the scattered
nature of the available data. Researchers on national growth have long been
able to draw on the Penn World Table and the World Development Indicators,
but there is no close equivalent for sub-national data. Recently this has begun
to change, in contributions by Gennaioli et al. (2013a,b), Lessmann (2011) and
Mitton (2013). The regional data sets of Gennaioli et al. (2013a) and Mitton (2013)
are especially comprehensive; the first covers 1569 regions from 110 countries,
which together account for 74% of the world’s land area and 97% of its GDP.
Mitton’s data set is broadly similar in coverage, but partially corrects for internal
variation in the cost of living, using data on living costs compiled for a number of
cities by the Economic Research Institute. More detailed data on output deflators
and regional living costs are typically unavailable, however, as we discuss in the
appendix.
These data sets are cross-sections; Lessmann (2011) has compiled a panel
data set on regional inequality, but for a smaller number of countries. For a few
countries, long-run data sets have been compiled going back to the nineteenth
century, such as the work of Turner et al. (1997) and Mitchener and McLean
(1999, 2003) on US data; the latter papers use some data on prices. For some
countries, the populations of cities have been used to proxy regional develop-
ment over centuries; see Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and Robinson (2011) and
Cantoni (2010) for examples and references.
The increased availability of establishment-level data for some countries can
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be used to address some research questions. Another recent development is the
ability to analyze data at smaller spatial scales even for developing countries.
Harari and La Ferrara (2013) illustrate the potential of this approach: they study
civil conflict in Africa at the sub-national level, based on areas that are 1 degree
of latitude by 1 degree of longitude, and relating conflict to localized crop fail-
ures or climate shocks. Moving to a smaller scale requires a careful approach
to spatial dependence and clustering; Barrios et al. (2012) is a recent treatment
of this issue. One way to use data at small scales is to aggregate them up to a
regional level, the origin of some variables in the Gennaioli et al. (2013a) and
Mitton (2013) data sets. For discussion of the use of geographical information
systems in regional economics, see Overman (2010).
One approach of particular interest, emerging from an interdisciplinary re-
search effort, has been to use satellite data on light density at night to develop
measures of income or population density at the sub-national level. As Chen
and Nordhaus (2011) and Henderson et al. (2012) emphasize, this is especially
attractive for measuring growth in countries where spatially-disaggregated stat-
istics are unreliable or not available. One application would be to map changes
in regional income for countries where hard-to-measure activity, like subsist-
ence agriculture or an urban informal sector, is significant. Relative to the use
of official data, the approach also allows population density and income to be
estimated for smaller spatial scales. For example, using data on light density for
22,850 sub-national units in developing countries, Hodler and Raschky (2010)
study whether foreign aid is disproportionately allocated to the home regions
of national leaders. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) use light density to
study whether regional outcomes in Africa are related to pre-colonial institu-
tions, and the local traditions of political centralization in particular.
Measurement issues, especially for developing countries, require thought
about how the data relate to the research questions of interest and the con-
cepts used in theoretical models. For example, flows of remittances between
regions, which can be significant, will influence regional income. The measured
output of some regions can be heavily influenced by natural resource revenues,
which will typically be transferred out of the region. To give a concrete example,
the treatment of mining output for Indonesia influences findings about regional
inequality and convergence (Hill et al. 2008). These points also suggest the im-
portance of considering whether the data at hand correspond most closely to the
regional equivalent of GDP (‘output’), or GNP (‘income’). The former is most
relevant for productivity comparisons, the latter for studying regional differ-
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ences in living standards. Whichever concept is adopted, measurement error in
regional data is likely to be a significant problem, and its consequences remain
under-explored by applied researchers.26
6.2 Spatial econometrics
If we recognize that regions are interdependent, statistical analysis has to pro-
ceed carefully. Outcomes at one location (for example, for productivity) will be
closely linked to the outcomes and characteristics of other regions. This implies
that the data-generating process will be characterized by spatial dependence;
ignoring this dependence is risky, which is clear from a time-series analogy. A
good econometrician knows that serial correlation is not solely an issue for infer-
ence, but often indicates that the empirical model has been mis-specified. This
is why econometricians are wary of mechanical autocorrelation corrections, or
exclusive reliance on clustering the standard errors. Related points apply to spa-
tial data, and yet many economists continue to analyze regional data as if spatial
dependence is a second-order problem. In fairness, it is true that spatial depend-
ence is inherently harder to address than time-series dependence, because the
one-dimensional ordering in time does not apply in the spatial case.
The field of spatial econometrics typically addresses this problem by pre-
specifying the relative strengths of interactions between regions, using the device
of a spatial weight matrix. The entries in the matrix are often based on distances
between locations or the existence of shared borders, although there is nothing
in the approach which requires the interactions to be determined by physical
geography. The literature is large and growing fast, and we highlight only the
areas most relevant to the discussion later in the chapter. This brief introduc-
tion draws partly on Anselin (2001) and especially the longer survey by Anselin
(2006).
For the case of N regions, a cross-section model with a spatial lag is conven-
tionally expressed in matrix notation as:
y = ρWy + Xβ+ ε (19)
where W is an N × N spatial weight matrix (typically normalized in some way)
and ρ indexes the strength of the spatial spillovers. Given ρ 6= 0, the spatial lag
26Additional measurement issues are discussed in some of the contributions in Kanbur and
Venables (2005). Measurement errors are likely even in the official data of developed countries.
Cameron and Muellbauer (2000) examine this issue for the UK, by comparing the UK’s Regional
Accounts with alternative sources of information on earnings.
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will be correlated with the disturbances ε, because the above model implies
y = (I − ρW)−1Xβ+ (I − ρW)−1ε (20)
Expanding each inverse implies that y at each location is a function of X and
ε at all locations, so that the effects of the explanatory variables and the errors
are transmitted across space rather than confined to each region. A corollary
is that Wy in (19) is necessarily endogenous and hence OLS estimates of that
model will be inconsistent. The literature has developed alternative procedures
for estimating such models, using either maximum likelihood or instrumental
variables.
Alternatively, we could allow for spatial dependence in the errors rather than
in the dependent variable, using the spatial error model:
y = Xβ+ u (21)
u = λWu + ε (22)
This is more closely related to a spatial lag model than it may seem. If we
note that u = (I − λW)−1ε we can use this in y = Xβ+ u and then have
y = Xβ+ (I − λW)−1ε
which implies
y = λWy + Xβ− λWXβ+ ε
This model could be estimated with or without the implied parameter restric-
tions. This is usually referred to as the Spatial Durbin Model, by analogy to the
derivation of common factor restrictions in time series models by Durbin (1960).
One interpretation is that a spatial lag helps to address the issue of omitted vari-
ables that are spatially correlated, but this is only true if the spatial dependence
corresponds to the relative interactions embedded in the weight matrix W.
There are two main interpretations of what spatial econometrics achieves.
The first is that the spatial dependence is not itself of direct interest, but must
be addressed to obtain reliable estimates of the parameters. In practice, some
parameters become much harder to interpret when a model incorporates spatial
spillovers. A common example would be attempts to link parameter estimates
to the rate of convergence in a neoclassical growth model. When regional in-
come levels are influenced by the income levels of neighbouring regions, the
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theoretical counterpart of an estimated convergence rate is unclear, because the
neoclassical growth model sits uneasily with the reality of interdependent re-
gions.
An alternative interpretation is that spillovers are of direct interest. In that
case, the estimate of ρ is seen as directly informative and not just a nuisance
parameter. The problem here is that spatial econometric models are silent on
mechanisms, and without a mechanism, adding a spatial lag of the dependent
variable will often seem too ad hoc to be informative; Gibbons and Overman
(2012) argue along these lines. They suggest that, for many applications, it would
be more sensible to emphasize spatial lags of the explanatory variables. That
approach is simpler to implement, and often easier to connect to theoretical
models.
Another frequent criticism of the spatial approach is that the researcher’s
choice of weight matrix W is necessarily arbitrary, because there are many dif-
ferent possibilities. This criticism might sometimes go too far. There is a sense
in which imposing ρ = 0 is an arbitrary choice too. Even a model with a mis-
specified weight matrix may have better properties than a model which does not
acknowledge spatial dependence at all. Approaches based instead on structural
models, such as the use of measures of market potential, also impose restric-
tions on the data that are best seen as maintained assumptions, and that are
open to question. Given the inevitable uncertainty over the appropriate weight
matrix, one way to make the analysis less arbitrary is to use Bayesian Model Av-
eraging, as in Crespo Cuaresma and Feldkircher (2012) and LeSage and Fischer
(2008). This allows a range of specifications to be considered, while formally
acknowledging the researcher’s uncertainty about the model and the nature of
the spatial interactions.
As things stand, there are clear divisions in the literature about the usefulness
of these methods. Corrado and Fingleton (2012), Gibbons and Overman (2012)
and LeSage and Fischer (2008) provide extensive discussion, from a variety of
perspectives. That opinion is divided can be seen from the different paths taken
in the applied literature. The spatial econometric papers take care over depend-
ence, but often adopt rather mechanical hypotheses about regional growth and
the nature of spillovers. In contrast, many papers by growth economists and
development economists put forward interesting hypotheses, but largely ignore
the issue of spatial dependence, or adopt corrections such as spatially-clustered
standard errors that do not address underlying problems with the regression
specification. One improvement would be to adopt a spatial equivalent to HAC
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estimators of standard errors, such as that developed by Kelejian and Prucha
(2007); but this continues to emphasize the problems for inference rather than
the structure of the estimated model. 27
In recent panel data studies, a common approach to error dependence has
been to interact time dummies with one or more regional characteristics. Ver-
sions of this are adopted in Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and Robinson (2011),
Burgess and Pande (2005), Burgess et al. (2005), and Cantoni (2010) among oth-
ers. We call this an assumption of proportional time effects. It can be seen as a
special case of the common factor structures studied in the macroeconometric
literature, where the error term has a component φi ft. Here ft is a vector of
common factors, the effects of which are allowed to vary across the regions i by
means of the (row) vector of factor loadings, φi. This could be a natural route
to take for regional data. For example, an urban core of manufacturing and
services might be strongly correlated with the national business cycle, while an
agricultural periphery would be less correlated with the business cycle and more
strongly correlated with climate variation and world food prices. In principle, a
factor structure could account for much of the spatial dependence in the data. So
far, there has not been much work analyzing regional data using these methods,
but the techniques are developing rapidly and could be important for regional
panel data models in particular. For surveys, see Eberhardt and Teal (2011) and
Sarifidis and Wansbeek (2012).
6.3 Regional growth regressions
A substantial fraction of the work on regional prosperity, especially that for
developing countries, is based on cross-section or panel data growth regressions.
Assessed as a whole, the literature inherits many of the issues of interpretation
that have undermined the cross-country study of economic growth. As Durlauf
et al. (2005, p.558) argue, the problem is not only that some regression-based
studies are unreliable. A further problem arises on the consumption side: it
can be hard, when presented with a particular study, to tell whether it has been
executed well or badly. This means that even the best studies may be assigned
relatively little weight.
Relative to the cross-country literature, the use of regional data may be much
27In Conley (1999), if an over-identified GMM approach is taken, spatial dependence is an
issue for estimation as well as inference. More generally, a model which does not allow for
spatial dependence is likely to be incomplete, again suggesting that spatial dependence matters
for point estimates as well as standard errors.
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less vulnerable to omitted variables. A common argument is that factors such as
institutions and cultural norms vary greatly across countries, but less so within
them. But the fact that regions are within the same polity can be a double-edged
sword, because they may influence each other, and be subject to common shocks,
to a much greater extent than countries. In some ways, the legacies of the cross-
country literature have been unfortunate. Empirical studies often treat the units
as essentially independent, or take the neoclassical growth model as the starting
point, either explicitly or implicitly; this approach has problems at the country
level, and seems all but untenable for regional data.
As already noted, many of the regression-based studies by growth econom-
ists and development economists fail to address spatial dependence. It is com-
mon for researchers to analyze variables or interventions which are highly cor-
related spatially, but the estimates may then be confounded by omitted spillovers,
or spatially correlated variables such as aspects of physical geography or market
access. At least some of these are known to be important features of the data,
and there could be gains from combining the hypotheses of these studies with
methods from spatial econometrics and macroeconometrics.
Another fundamental issue receives even less emphasis in the literature: the
basic causal structure implicit in a regression sits uneasily with a spatial equi-
librium. The most obvious and well-known problem is that many regional
characteristics, such as average education or financial depth, are not fixed en-
dowments, but endogenously determined outcomes. But this also hints at a
deeper identification problem, and one that has been less widely noted. At first
glance, regression-based methods give simple answers about the determinants
of regional prosperity. But their interpretation is complicated by endogenous
agglomeration. When a given variable changes, this could reconfigure spatial
patterns of activity in ways that (for example) amplify the effects of minor dif-
ferences, just as agglomeration can amplify minor differences in physical geo-
graphy. This makes it hard to interpret estimated associations between regional
growth and explanatory variables. To make this point concrete, consider the
estimated growth effect β of a one-unit change in a given variable X for one
region. If X increased by the same amount for all regions, would the growth
effect be β for each region? This is rarely clear, but then it is hard to interpret
the results from regression-based studies. Put differently, it is not clear what is
being assumed about the simultaneous role of changes in the spatial distribu-
tion of activity. In the context of a spatial equilibrium, this attempted distinction
is artificial and impossible to maintain, but that is precisely the point. It com-
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plicates the interpretation of much empirical work, not least its consequences
for policy. It also indicates the benefits of structural models, where meaningful
counterfactuals are much easier to construct.
Another distinctive feature of regional data is that the cross-section dimen-
sion and the time dimension often have broadly similar magnitudes. This sug-
gests that panel time series methods, such as those introduced by Pesaran and
Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999), could be natural candidates for the ana-
lysis of regional data. For reasons that are not fully clear, few studies have
applied these methods to regional questions; exceptions include Cameron and
Muellbauer (2001) for Britain, and Trivedi (2006) for India. The first of these
briefly explores time-series specifications in which the dependent and independ-
ent variables are formed as deviations from the average values of contiguous
regions.
6.4 Structural models
We have repeatedly emphasized the dangers of analyzing spatial data without
thinking in terms of a spatial equilibrium. That might suggest abandoning re-
gressions in favour of calibrating or estimating structural models, often drawing
heavily on the work we described in section 4 of the chapter. Examples of this
approach include Donaldson (2010), Redding (2012), and Van Nieuwerburgh
and Weill (2010). The quantitative use of structural models has many advant-
ages: general equilibrium effects are accounted for, parameters should have a
clear interpretation, and progress can be made even when some data (such as
regional price levels or productivity levels) are lacking, by inferring these from
other outcomes. Further, the use of a structural model allows counterfactual
simulations and the quantification of welfare effects, both of which are attractive
when policies are to be assessed. Holmes (2010) emphasizes that the approach
can be used to evaluate policies that have never previously been implemented.
He discusses the approach further, as does Combes (2011).
We review several of these studies below. If structural models have a weak-
ness, it is the uncertainty over whether it is the model speaking or the data; the
list of maintained assumptions is often extensive, and the data may know more
than the model can say. There is a complementary role for reduced-form ap-
proaches, partly in drawing attention to interesting associations, and partly as a
check on the maintained assumptions of any given structural model, as in Don-
aldson (2010). But it seems clear that structural models will have an important,
even pre-eminent, place within the best future work on regional data.
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6.5 Spatial discontinuity designs
We now discuss a method which has become a powerful way of identifying
causal effects in the recent literature, and which drives some of the most import-
ant papers. This is to look for institutions or policies that sometimes stop (or
change) at the borders of regions, and quantify their causal effects by comparing
outcomes either side of the border. We illustrate the application of this method,
and some of its pitfalls, using the classic paper by Holmes (1998).
Holmes was interested in whether state-level policies influence the location
of manufacturing activity. It had long been known that manufacturing activity
had grown slowly in the industrial north of the US and more rapidly in other
regions, including in the ‘right-to-work’ states which weakened unions by state
legislation that outlawed closed shops. But simple correlations between regional
outcomes and a right-to-work indicator are not all that informative about causal
effects, given that regions may differ in other ways, such as geography and cli-
mate. Holmes’s answer to this problem was to identify sets of counties adjacent
to borders, where right-to-work laws applied one side of the border and not
the other. Using the presence of these laws as a proxy for more generally ‘pro-
business’ policies, he found large effects: manufacturing’s share of employment
increased by about a third on crossing from an ‘anti-business’ state to a ‘pro-
business’ state. As Holmes (1998, p. 671) explains, the power of this approach is
that:
...at state borders, the geographic determinants of the distribution of
manufacturing — for example, climate, soil fertility, access to trans-
portation, and the level of agglomeration benefits — are approxim-
ately the same on both sides of the border. What differs at the border
is policy.
In what follows, we call this approach a spatial discontinuity design. It has since
been applied in other contexts, including to political institutions and financial
reform. For now, we note that Holmes’s paper not only demonstrates the power
of this method, but also provides a careful account of its limitations. He notes
that the effects of policy differences far from the border may be smaller than the
effects close to the border. After all, a firm may be more influenced by policy
differences between locations that are close to one another (and hence similar in
terms of market potential) than between locations that are further distant. With
this in mind, Holmes interprets his estimates as upper bounds on the effects of
a statewide policy change. The same issue substantially complicates a welfare
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analysis. A policy difference that shifts a firm from one location to another could
have minor effects on welfare (for example, if a firm chooses to locate one side of
a border rather than another) or major effects (for example, if policy differences
compounded the decline of America’s northern cities).
A second issue is that borders are not randomly generated. This means that
an identifying assumption — geographic characteristics are the same either side
of the border — will not always hold. The example in Holmes (1998) is that some
state boundaries coincide with discontinuities in nature represented by moun-
tain ranges and coal veins. As a result, he drops some observations, but acknow-
ledges that there may be other unknown instances in the data. Although this is a
limitation, spatial discontinuity designs are likely to hold various other charac-
teristics constant, to an extent that is otherwise hard to achieve. They represent
one of the most informative methods for learning about regional prosperity.
6.6 Synthetic controls
For some regional questions, an approach based on spatial discontinuity may
be either infeasible or uninformative. This is especially likely when a researcher
is interested in events or characteristics confined to a single region, or a small
number of regions. As an example, consider a researcher interested in the effect
of localized conflict on a single region’s prosperity. There is not an obvious way
to construct a counterfactual. Comparing outcomes with those of a neighbouring
region may not work, because there is no guarantee that the two regions will
share similar characteristics. The alternative is a less formal case study, but that
has problems of its own (see Temple 1999).
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) considered this problem and introduced a
method for constructing a ‘synthetic control’, which can be compared to the
region of interest. In an application to Spanish regions, their specific aim was
to quantify the economic effects of Basque terrorism on the Basque Country.
To do this, they compared the evolution of Basque Country outcomes with a
weighted average of other Spanish regions: the synthetic control. The weights
were chosen so that the characteristics of the synthetic control resembled those
of the Basque Country in the years before terrorism. The synthetic control can
be seen as an approximation to the required counterfactual, the Basque Country
without terrorism.
More formally, consider a case where there are J control regions available
(in their case, the Spanish regions other than the Basque Country). The treated
region has a set of K characteristics stored in a (K× 1) vector X1. The J control
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regions have corresponding pre-treatment characteristics stored in a K× J matrix
X0. Drawing on ideas in the statistical literature on matching, the suggestion
of Abadie and Gardeazabal is to choose a (J × 1) column vector of weights
W = (w1, ..., wJ)′ in order to minimize
(X1 − X0W)′V(X1 − X0W)
subject to wi ≥ 0 and ∑wi = 1, and where V is a diagonal matrix with
non-negative components, which weight the different characteristics.
Hence, as well as choosing the set of K relevant characteristics, the researcher
has to decide how to weight them. The diagonal elements of V could be based on
subjective judgments about their relative importance. In their own application,
Abadie and Gardeazabal use a more objective approach, and choose the elements
of V so that GDP per capita in the synthetic control is close to that of the Basque
country for the pre-treatment years. Once a researcher has chosen or estimated
V, and obtained the weights W, outcomes can be compared between the region
of interest and the synthetic control. For example, the GDP per capita of the
control will just be a weighted average of the GDP per capita of the J regions,
where the weights are the (possibly zero) individual elements of W.
The synthetic control method lends itself to graphical comparisons of out-
comes, and robustness tests using the placebo approach familiar from the treat-
ment effects literature. Applications to regional data are currently limited, but
the method is especially likely to be useful when the number of regions is small,
or the treatment of interest is confined to a small number of regions. It also
provides a bridge between the regression-based methods favoured by econom-
ists, and the more qualitative, case-study approaches favoured in some other
disciplines. An introductory overview of the method by Abadie et al. (2012)
makes this point in relation to political science.
7 What determines regional prosperity?
We now turn to the empirical evidence on regional growth. Following the pre-
cedent of the cross-country literature, our use of the term ‘growth’ is deliberately
elastic. We use the term to encompass the study of influences on levels (or rel-
ative levels) as well as influences on steady-state growth rates. In fact, most of
what we have to say has more bearing on the former, and so ‘prosperity’ might
be a better term.
There is a second ambiguity, to a far greater extent than in the cross-country
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literature. Regional growth sometimes refers to an increase in population rather
than productivity, as factors of production gravitate towards particular areas.
In fact, some authors have argued that measures such as population density
will better capture underlying differences in productivity and quality of life (for
example, Rappaport and Sachs, 2003). Many spatial models predict that equal-
ization of real incomes will be achieved through adjustment in nominal wages,
price levels and local population sizes. Hence, the criterion for regional suc-
cess, or the best interpretation of ‘growth’, varies across studies and research
questions.
7.1 Physical geography
We start with physical geography, which can influence economic activity and
population density through many channels; it is a more disparate topic than it
might appear at first. Among the channels highlighted in the literature are access
to the coast or transport networks, and physical transport costs more broadly;
climate factors such as temperature or precipitation; and disease ecology.28 Less
obviously, as we also discuss below, physical geography can be a long-run influ-
ence on cultural and social norms, and local institutional development. And it
may be especially important for developing countries, some of which are much
larger and more heterogeneous internally than, say, the countries of Western
Europe.
Geography can be thought of as influencing prices (partly through higher
transport costs for remote regions), total factor productivity (in both agriculture
and industry, see Dell, Jones and Olken, 2012) and also incentives for factor
accumulation. One of the most well-known findings is that economic activity is
disproportionately coastal: Gallup et al. (1999) report that the areas of the US,
Western Europe, and northeast Asia that are within 100 kilometres of the coast
contain just three percent of the world’s inhabited land area, but thirteen percent
of its population, and at least 32 percent of global GDP.
Coastal locations, by lowering the costs of external trade, can be seen as
favouring high productivity. Rappaport and Sachs (2003) argue that the coastal
concentration in the US derives primarily from a productivity effect. The direct
benefit of coastal location will be amplified by effects on economic geography,
as firms and populations form agglomerations in coastal areas. This can also
introduce path dependence; Bleakley and Lin (2012) study this issue using the
28Relevant papers include Bloom and Sachs (1998), Dell, Jones and Olken (2012), and Sachs
and Malaney (2002), respectively.
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proximity of many American cities to historical obstacles to water navigation,
where continued transport relied on overland hauling. They find that these
obstacles continue to be associated with relatively high population densities,
even though their direct relevance to transport costs has long since disappeared.
Some of the evidence that physical geography matters is based on studying
the location of individual industries (Ellison and Glaeser, 1999; Davis and Wein-
stein, 2008). Much of this evidence is for developed countries, but Felkner and
Townsend (2011) use detailed data for Thailand to show that enterprise locations
are associated with various geographic characteristics.
When the data are analyzed at higher levels of aggregation, the interpreta-
tion is more difficult. The cross-section study by Gennaioli et al. (2013a) finds
that average temperature has limited explanatory power for output per capita
within countries. Mitton (2013) considers a wider range of geographic and cli-
mate variables; he finds that many are statistically significant, but collectively
their explanatory power remains relatively modest. Dell, Jones and Olken (2009)
and Nordhaus (2006) find some effects of temperature using variation at smal-
ler spatial scales; in Nordaus (2006), there are opposing effects on output per
capita and output per area. The latter is relevant because, given the nature of
a spatial equilibrium, some climate effects are likely to be more readily observ-
able in relative population density, rather than relative productivity. As we have
emphasized throughout, in models with heterogeneous sectors and/or mobile
workers, trying to infer fundamental influences on productivity from comparis-
ons of average output per capita is not straightforward.29
Instead, it should be recognized that physical geography will operate partly
through the spatial distribution of the population. Some aspects of physical geo-
graphy may have a limited direct effect on production costs - for example, fewer
cloudy days per year - but can still influence wages and incomes, through their
impact on the location decisions of utility-maximizing mobile workers (Roback
1982). Using US data, Rappaport and Sachs (2003) point out that proximity to
Great Lake or ocean coasts helps to explain population density in levels and
changes; as well as a productivity explanation, there may also be a quality-of-
life effect. Over the twentieth century, the US saw a large-scale movement of
population towards areas with good weather. Many of the northern industrial
cities have lost population over time, while cities in the Sun Belt have grown.
Rappaport (2007) argues that, as US incomes have risen, an income effect on the
29In one of the first studies of these questions, Warner (2002) calls a version of this problem
the ‘mobility bias’.
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demand for good weather has been an important driver of this adjustment.30
These ideas are supported by studies which consider factor incomes. There
is a large literature which links regional variation in wages and rents to phys-
ical geography through amenities such as better weather. A general finding is
that some of the regional variation in wages can be explained by differences
in climate-related amenities (Roback, 1982; Beeson, 1991). And researchers
primarily interested in the effects of economic geography sometimes find effects
of measures of physical geography in regional wage regressions (for example,
Amiti and Cameron, 2007).
Even this brief summary hints at the difficulties of studying physical geo-
graphy in the context of a spatial equilibrium. It can influence productivity
directly and via economic geography, and partly through the location decisions
of workers based on amenities, while path dependence complicates this even
further. Various researchers have sought to cut through these complexities by
studying major shocks or perturbations. Much of this work points to the sus-
tained importance of fixed regional characteristics, even in the face of other
changes. For example, Hornbeck (2012b) studies agricultural land values in the
Great Plains of the US from 1945 to 2002, and shows that long-run technological
progress has not diminished the importance of local environmental advantages.
It is clear that, historically, some climate shocks have led to substantial pop-
ulation movements. Hornbeck (2012a) looks at the economic effects of the Dust
Bowl, the severe drought and subsequent wind erosion of topsoil in sections of
the American Plains in the 1930s. The erosion of topsoil greatly reduced agri-
cultural productivity in the affected areas, leading to falls in the price of land,
out-migration and diverted in-migration. As Hornbeck notes, adjustment was
achieved mainly by population movements.
Other major shocks have also been studied, as in the work of Davis and
Weinstein (2002). They show that the relative population densities of Japanese
regions have been remarkably stable over the past 8,000 years, and that even
large-scale shocks, such as the Allied bombing of Japanese cities during World
War II, had only temporary effects on the Japanese city size distribution. The
findings indicate the long-run importance of fixed characteristics of locations,
including their physical geography.
Finally, a more complex set of arguments traces the influences of physical
30The argument is that, as consumption goes up, the marginal utility of consumption falls and
hence individuals are more willing to forego income for the sake of better weather; they migrate
to regions with better weather, forcing wages in those regions downwards and house prices
upwards until a spatial equilibrium is restored. See also Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013a).
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geography on local institutions, cultural and social norms, the distribution of
ethnic groups, and even political trajectories. Physical geography can some-
times manifest itself in profound differences of institutions and culture, with
the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of north-
western Pakistan as a well-known example. More generally, as observers such
as Scott (2009) have discussed, state-building sometimes founders in the moun-
tains. Herbst (2000) argues that the large interiors of some African countries,
with their low population densities and disconnected peripheries, have made
it difficult for governments to maintain control over their territories, and have
limited the development of effective states. Even more complex effects of geo-
graphy are possible. China’s ethnic geography and cultural differences, it is
sometimes argued, partly reflect historical differences between areas suitable for
arable farming (and hence permanent settlement) and the more nomadic cul-
tures of the pastoral areas.31 Moreover, geography can shape the response to
historical events: looking at the specific issue of rugged terrain, Nunn and Puga
(2012) argue that its direct costs have been offset, in Africa’s case, by the protec-
tion it offered from the slave trade, with effects that have persisted to the present
day.
Taken together, these points indicate a major challenge for empirical research-
ers: much remains to be done in understanding when and how physical geo-
graphy influences regional prosperity. And aspects of this task seem increas-
ingly urgent, given the scope for climate change to reshape productivity levels
and specialization across the world, both across and within countries. Dell, Jones
and Olken (2012) find that increases in temperature adversely affect output in
poor countries, and may also have consequences for political stability. It should
also be emphasized that, even if regional prosperity seems only modestly af-
fected by temperature differentials between regions, the effects of climate change
on national comparative advantage could be substantial. This in itself would be
enough to drive new patterns of regional growth and decline for many of the
world’s countries, leaving aside other effects such as desertification.
Recent work by Krusell and Smith (2009), Hassler and Krusell (2012), and
Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013b) seeks to quantify the differential effects of
climate change across distinct locations, an approach pioneered by Nordhaus in
his development of the multi-region RICE model. Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg
(2013b), in particular, emphasize the importance of a spatial dimension to the
analysis: as the climate changes, welfare losses arise because of frictions in the
31See Kaplan (2013) for an overview of this argument.
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movement of people and goods across locations. One consequence is that, in
the presence of migration restrictions between the global South and the global
North, the estimated welfare losses are much larger for the global South. Their
work is based on the effects of temperature changes; for at least some countries,
the uncertainties for future regional development are compounded by the pos-
sibilities of water stress, coastal flooding, changes in the incidence of extreme
weather, and new risks to health.
7.2 Market access
Geographers have long pointed out that access to markets influences regional
output levels. For example, Harris (1954) argued that the demand facing a given
region depends on the distance-weighted GDP of all other regions. More re-
cently, the empirical literature by economists has adopted measures of market
access derived from structural models in the New Economic Geography tradi-
tion. We now provide a brief review of this literature; for more detailed surveys,
see Combes (2011), Combes et al. (2008), Head and Mayer (2004), and Redding
(2010). Assessed as a whole, the literature strongly supports the idea that market
access or proximity influences regional prosperity.
In sections 4 and 5 of the chapter, we reviewed models in which firms in
more central locations will face higher demand for their products and thus, ini-
tially, higher profits. The usual assumption of free entry will equalize rates of
return across locations but, as Head and Mayer (2006) note, the adjustment could
take place via local employment or production, or through changes in wages -
or, more generally, the remuneration of immobile production factors. The bulk
of the literature has focused on adjustment through wages, and much of our
discussion will look at this mechanism. But there is also a literature which con-
siders adjustment via employment and production changes, often drawing on
models with a freely-tradable numéraire sector which makes wages invariant
to demand. Key papers in this ‘home market effect’ literature include Davis
and Weinstein (1999, 2003), Head and Ries (2001) and Hanson and Xiang (2004).
Head and Mayer (2006) show how these papers relate to the literature on adjust-
ment via wages. Empirically, it is often difficult to separate these two adjustment
mechanisms cleanly.
Turning to adjustment via wage changes, a first strand in this literature builds
on Redding and Venables (2004). Their influential paper takes the spatial dis-
tribution of production and expenditure as given, and considers the wages that
firms in each location can afford to pay. Firms in more remote locations incur
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higher trade costs when selling their products. This lowers the value added at-
tributable to the factors of production; labour, as the relatively immobile factor,
is affected most. Hence, the income and productivity levels of a region are influ-
enced by its position relative to potential markets — in other words, by economic
geography.
The empirical specification of Redding and Venables is ultimately based
on the model of Krugman and Venables (1995). Symmetric, monopolistically-
competitive firms from a given location i sell their tradable output in N different
locations subject to trade costs. Demand is of the CES form and production takes
place under increasing returns to scale. If labour is the only factor of production,
free entry implies the following relation between (nominal) wages in location i









where wi denotes wages, Ej and Pj are respectively expenditure on traded goods
and the CES price index in location j, Tij are trade costs between locations i and
j, σ the elasticity of substitution between product varieties produced by different
firms, and A is a constant.32 Trade costs take the familiar iceberg form: for every
unit shipped only 1/Tij units arrive, where Tij = 1 would correspond to free
trade.
Equation (23) says that wages in region i depend on the sum of expenditure
in all other regions, adjusted for price differences and discounted by bilateral
trade costs. Redding and Venables call the summation term in (23) ‘market ac-
cess’. Other authors, including Head and Mayer (2006), prefer the term ‘real
market potential’, to highlight the price component Pj absent from more tradi-
tional measures such as the Harris (1954) market potential. Redding and Ven-
ables estimate (23) for a cross-section of 101 developed and developing countries
for the year 1994. They find that GDP per capita (used as a proxy for wages)
is correlated with their measures of market access, even after controlling for
characteristics such as institutions and resource endowments.
The findings suggest that relative prosperity has a spatial dimension, but the
assumption that labour is immobile across locations is less attractive for regional
32Redding and Venables also allow for technological differences between firms in different
locations, intermediate inputs and other internationally-mobile primary factors. This implies
that wages will also depend on technology levels and the price of intermediate inputs in each
location.
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data than cross-country data. In contrast, Hanson (2005) allows for labour mo-
bility. In order to obtain empirically-relevant spatial production patterns, with
activity at each location, he follows Helpman (1998) and introduces a nontraded
good (housing) to create an additional dispersion force. While real wages are
equalized across regions in this model, nominal wages are still a function of















where B is a constant, Hj is the housing stock of region j (assumed to be in
fixed supply) and µ is the expenditure share of the traded goods sector. Hanson
refers to the summation term in (24) as the ‘augmented market potential’ of
region i, again to distinguish it from simpler measures that do not correct for
price variation. He estimates (24) on a sample of 3075 counties in the continental
United States for the period 1970-1990, and finds a strong positive correlation
between changes in augmented market potential and changes in nominal wages.
These two frameworks have been used to study the geographical variation in
wages and output levels for a wide range of countries, regions and time periods.
Breinlich (2006) and Head and Mayer (2006) use the Redding-Venables approach
to explain the variation in output per capita and wages across European Union
regions, arguing that labour mobility is relatively low. Both papers find that
the measure of real market potential in (23) performs no better than the simpler
Harris market potential, in terms of explanatory power as measured by the R2.
Using modifications of the Hanson approach, Brakman et al. (2004a) and Mion
(2004) provide evidence for the importance of proximity to sources of demand
for German and Italian regions respectively.
Recent research has extended the ideas to low-income and middle-income
countries, often based on the Redding-Venables approach. Bosker and Garretsen
(2012) find a positive correlation between market access and GDP per worker
for sub-Saharan African countries. Fally et al. (2010) find a correlation between
wages and market access for Brazilian states, Amiti and Cameron (2007) for
Indonesian districts, and Hering and Poncet (2009, 2010) for Chinese provinces
and cities.
A common finding is that, although the market access variables are signi-
ficant, the magnitude of the estimated effect is substantially lower than in Red-
33See Hanson (2005, section 2) for a full derivation. Note that local expenditure is still taken
to be exogenous despite full labour mobility.
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ding and Venables (2004). One explanation is that (with the exception of Bosker
and Garretsen) these newer studies work at a disaggregated level, using either
firm- or worker-level data. This enables them to control for additional covariates
which are likely to be correlated with market access, including human capital.
Moreover, these papers study wage differences in a regional context, where la-
bour mobility will promote the equalization of wages. The finding of Hering and
Poncet (2010) that variation in market access has a stronger impact on wages of
highly-skilled workers, whose mobility is more restricted in China, lends sup-
port to this explanation.
There are some ways in which the developed-country literature needs modi-
fication when applied to developing countries or regions. For sub-Saharan
Africa, Bosker and Garretsen (2008) find that the correlation between GDP per
worker and market access is relatively weak. Their preferred explanation is that
manufacturing, the sector to which the wage equation applies most directly,
is still underdeveloped in the African case. In their study of China, Hering and
Poncet (2010) show that wages in private firms, and particularly in foreign firms,
react strongly to variation in a city’s market access, but wages in state-owned en-
terprises much less so. These findings suggest that structural and institutional
conditions can influence estimated relationships between wages and market ac-
cess.
Since the cross-section study of Redding and Venables (2004), a number of
papers have shown that the correlation holds using variation in market access
over time. As mentioned previously, Hanson (2005) correlates changes in nom-
inal wages with changes in market potential. Head and Mayer (2010) apply
the Redding and Venables approach to all countries in the world with available
trade data over the period 1965-2003. Breinlich (2006) and Bosker and Garret-
sen (2012) estimate specifications which sometimes include region and country
fixed effects, respectively. The general finding is that output or income remain
correlated with market access, but the correlation is substantially reduced when
using the within variation.
Can the correlation between income and market access be interpreted as
causal? One issue is that market access might be correlated with other funda-
mental determinants of local income levels, such as institutions or endowments.
This can work both ways, since some determinants may themselves be influ-
enced by market access; Redding and Schott (2003) construct a model in which
incentives to acquire human capital are lower in countries with weak market ac-
cess. But the fact that market access effects are weaker in the within dimension
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does suggest that market access may be correlated with time-invariant determ-
inants of income levels omitted from cross-section regressions.
A further problem is that, in essence, wage equation estimates are based
on regressions of ‘own’ income (wi) on measures of income/expenditure levels
in neighbouring cities, regions or countries (Ej). But as discussed in section
6.2, this leads to a correlation between regression disturbances and the market
access variable, and inconsistent estimates. This is most evident from equations
(19) and (20) once we realize that market access can be seen as a spatial lag of
regional expenditure levels adjusted for price differences (EjPσ−1j ), where the
T1−σij are the elements of the spatial weight matrix.
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One approach has been to search for instrumental variables, but the exclusion
restrictions are often questionable, and the scope for finding a time-varying in-
strument is limited. A more promising approach is to study quasi-natural exper-
iments in which there is exogenous variation in market access. The pioneering
work in this area is Hanson (1996, 1997), who uses the changes in market access
generated by Mexico’s trade liberalization in 1985. Focusing on the apparel sec-
tor, Hanson (1996) shows that the pre-liberalization period was characterized by
a strong regional wage gradient, with wages declining with distance from Mex-
ico City. The 1985 trade liberalization led to a partial breakdown of this gradient,
which Hanson attributes to a relocation of apparel assembly production to re-
gions bordering the United States. The evidence for other manufacturing sectors
is weaker, although the earlier introduction of special enterprise zones near the
border (the maquiladoras programme) led to a compression of regional wage dif-
ferences (Hanson, 1997).
Another event, which seems even more likely to isolate an exogenous and
sizeable change in market access, is the division of Germany in 1949 and its re-
unification in 1990. This is studied by Redding and Sturm (2008). They base their
analysis on the model by Helpman (1998) but look at its predictions for equilib-
rium population sizes rather than nominal wages. They show that, consistent
with the model’s predictions, West German cities close to the border with East
Germany experienced a substantial decline (and after reunification, recovery) in
population growth relative to other West German cities.
In an extension of the Redding-Sturm approach, Brülhart, Carrère and Trion-
fetti (2012) use the end of the Cold War, and the fall of the communist regimes
34More precisely, we have wages or output per capita on the left-hand side of the market access
equation (23), and regional expenditure levels on the right-hand side. In practice, however,
regional wages and expenditure levels are highly correlated, and estimating a market access
equation is conceptually similar to estimating equation (19)
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in Eastern Europe, to isolate a change in market access. They study the differen-
tial impact on Austrian municipalities bordering former communist economies,
relative to interior municipalities. In contrast to Redding and Sturm, they have
both wage and employment data at their disposal, and can analyze adjustment
through both channels. They find that wages and employment growth were both
influenced positively by better market access, but the estimated impact on em-
ployment growth was about three times as large as the impact on wage growth.
This again suggests that, in settings where labour mobility is important, studies
focused on wages could miss important forms of adjustment.
Overall, the literature indicates that prosperity is strongly associated with
market access, at a range of levels of aggregation. This association is consistent
with formal models from the New Economic Geography literature, in which the
link is causal. One qualification is that, in some circumstances, the effects of
market access on wage and employment patterns will be observationally equi-
valent to the effects of technological spillovers and labour pooling (Duranton
and Puga, 2004; Redding, 2010). Some papers seek to address these alternative
explanations using control variables, but their treatment is often less sophistic-
ated than the treatment of market access, and draws less heavily on structural
models. Another remaining challenge, and one of particular relevance for this
chapter, is to integrate the analysis of adjustments in wages and those in employ-
ment. In seeking to understand regional prosperity, it would be useful to know
how labour mobility and various institutional constraints or frictions shape the
relative importance of these two forms of adjustment.
7.3 Openness
Since the New Economic Geography borrows heavily from trade theory, a nat-
ural research topic has been the relationship between external trade, internal
economic geography, and regional disparities. Fujita et al. (1999) analyze this
issue in detail, suggesting that trade could work to disperse manufacturing in-
dustry as a whole, but also lead to the spatial clustering of specific industries.
Given the empirical importance of market access effects, it seems inevitable that
spatial patterns of activity will be influenced by the nature of external trade, as
in the work of Hanson (1996) reviewed above.
Redding (2012) uses a structural model (reviewed in section 4 above) to ex-
amine the effects of a fall in trade costs between the US and Canada, leaving
internal trade costs unchanged. Given its greater trade intensity with US states,
Central Canada would gain more than Western Canada under population im-
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mobility. But if the population is mobile across regions, the improved market
access of Central Canada causes it to gain population, while Western Canada
would see a decline in population. The endogenous reallocation of population
continues until all Canadian regions gain equally from the fall in trade costs, in
the absence of costs to mobility.
Empirical work on external trade and regional disparities has often taken
a reduced-form approach. In a study of Latin America, Serra et al. (2006)
argue that regional disparities modestly increased, at least temporarily, in the
wake of trade liberalization; the effect seems especially marked for Mexico. A
further issue, especially for developing countries, is the influence of FDI on re-
gional prosperity. Brakman et al. (2009) review the literature on the relationship
between international business, FDI and agglomeration. A small empirical liter-
ature studies the links between FDI and regional inequality directly, particularly
for the Chinese case, where FDI has been heavily concentrated in the eastern
provinces (Wei et al. 2009). Lessmann (2013) studies China, and a wider sample
of 55 countries over thirty years, 1980-2009; his main result is that FDI inflows
may increase regional inequality in developing countries, but there is no evid-
ence of a similar effect in richer countries.
7.4 Transport and infrastructure
In his book The Age of Capital, Hobsbawm (1962) briefly recounts the story of
teachers sent from Rome to Sicily in the 1860s with plans to standardize the
school curriculum. Differences in regional idioms, and the extent of regional
insularity, were so extreme that the Sicilians mistook the teachers for visitors
from England. This story can stand in for others: differences in regional dia-
lects and social norms testify to long spans of time in which regions were not
closely integrated. What changed this insularity, in Italy as elsewhere, was in
large part new technologies for transport and communication. It is a truism that
lower transport costs have made regions, countries and the world smaller, and
played a major role in reconfiguring the spatial distribution of economic activ-
ity. Williamson (2006) provides an account of the transport revolution of the
nineteenth century, documenting substantial falls in transport costs, driven by
canal-building, steamships and railways. In 1817, it took fifty-two days to ship
a load of freight from Cincinnati to New York by wagon and riverboat; by 1852
this had fallen to six days (Williamson, 2006, p. 8).
As we saw in section 4, theoretical models differ in their predictions about
the effects of lower internal transport costs, partly because lower costs make it
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easier for the consumers of a rural periphery to be served from cities. The effect
of transport costs has been central to the New Economic Geography, and detailed
treatments can be found in Fujita et al. (1999) and Combes et al. (2008), among
others. The ambiguity of the models makes empirical work especially important,
but it is not easy to quantify the causal effect of infrastructure. Investment in
transport and communications will sometimes respond to regional changes in
activity or population that originated with other forces. When policy-makers are
forward-looking, national and sub-national governments may invest in regions
with good growth prospects, or that are politically important. The research
questions are difficult, but also highly relevant: investments in infrastructure for
depressed areas have often been central to regional policies in Europe, China
and elsewhere.
One approach to identifying causal effects is to construct a structural model
with a role for transport, such as a computable general equilibrium model. The
huge advantage of this approach is that counterfactuals can be studied, by sim-
ulating the patterns of regional development under different assumptions about
transport technology or infrastructure investment. Williamson (1974) is an early
example of this approach, Herrendorf et al. (2012) a more recent one, both
covering the effects of nineteenth-century transport changes in the USA. If this
approach has a weakness, it lies in the ambiguity already noted: it is not clear
how to choose between models, but conclusions about the effects of transport
costs are sensitive to this choice.
The work of Donaldson (2010), briefly reviewed in section 4, develops a Ri-
cardian trade model with many locations and commodities, and trade costs. He
uses this to study the introduction of the railway network of pre-partition In-
dia, seen as reducing trade costs between districts. His reduced-form regression
estimate is that access to the railway increases a district’s real income by 16%,
and he finds that lower trade costs account for the entirety of this reduced-form
effect. Donaldson and Hornbeck (2012) study the nineteenth-century expansion
of the US railway network, finding effects that are more than double those in the
well-known ‘social saving’ approach of Fogel (1964).
Michaels (2008) studies the introduction of the US Interstate Highway Sys-
tem, which connected cities and border crossings, but also lowered trade costs
for the rural counties crossed by new roads. He finds that these counties exper-
ienced significant increases in trade-related activity, but without major changes
in specialization in the directions predicted by trade theory.35 Banerjee et al.
35More precisely, motivated by trade theory, he finds small increases in the wage bill of skilled
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(2012) study access to transport infrastructure in China, exploiting the historical
importance of connections between the major cities of the nineteenth century
and the Treaty Ports. They find that regions closer to historical transportation
networks have significantly higher levels of GDP per capita and higher average
firm profits, but there is no evidence that the advantaged regions grew more
quickly over the period studied (1986-2006).
For some developing countries, regional prosperity may also be influenced
by energy infrastructure, and particularly the extent of electrification. It has
been estimated that around a quarter of the world’s population lack access to
electricity. Lipscomb et al. (2013) study the long-run effects of electrification in
Brazil: using spatial variation in the scope for hydropower plants, they can isol-
ate exogenous variation in the extension of the network. Their results suggest
that electrification brings significant gains in educational attainment, employ-
ment rates and income per capita.
The effects of geographic characteristics on electrification programmes have
also been exploited by Dinkelman (2011) and Rud (2012). Dinkelman studies
the effects of a household electrification programme in South Africa, using land
gradient to isolate exogenous variation in access. The results indicate significant
effects on female employment, potentially due to time released from home pro-
duction and increased small-scale labour demand. In a study of Indian states,
Rud (2012) uses the uneven availability of groundwater for electric-pump-based
irrigation schemes to instrument for the expansion of the electricity network. His
panel data estimates indicate that an increase in rural connections of one stand-
ard deviation would increase a state’s manufacturing output by almost 15%.
Massive investments in infrastructure often appeal to policy-makers seek-
ing to accelerate development by concrete, visible means; Lenin once defined
communism as Soviet power plus electrification. This political appeal might
suggest a risk of over-investment, and we have already seen that the effects of
transport investments can be ambiguous. Even for electrification, the analysis
of welfare effects becomes more complicated in a spatial equilibrium. New in-
frastructure can induce population movements that increase the demands on
locally-provided public goods. Dinkelman and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012) study
the issue, again for household electrification in South Africa, and find that con-
gestion effects can halve the estimated local welfare gains.
workers relative to unskilled workers in skill-abundant counties, and small reductions where
skills were scarce; but there is no evidence for changes in the industrial composition towards
industries intensive in the abundant factor.
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7.5 Institutions and local political economy
The study of institutions has been central to recent work on comparative devel-
opment. National institutions will be among the forces that shape patterns of
regional specialization and relative incomes, partly because they will influence
comparative advantage at the national level. But there may also be important
local variation in institutions within countries, as Acemoglu and Dell (2010),
Naritomi et al. (2012) and Tabellini (2010) all emphasize. Its consequences
have now been investigated for countries in Africa, Latin America and South
Asia. It also has implications for the study of national development: countries
could share the same rating for institutional quality - effectively a weighted av-
erage across regions - but differ in their internal institutional variation, with
consequences for agglomeration and overall activity.
The idea that institutions vary within countries needs a little justification. In
federal countries in particular, such as Brazil, India and Mexico, some areas of
law may be determined locally, and de jure institutions will then vary across
regions. But even where de jure institutions are similar, there may be substan-
tial inter-regional differences in how these institutions operate in practice, partly
given the importance of informal institutions. Tabellini (2010) emphasizes that
given institutions can function differently across locations. He suggests that the
judicial system works differently in southern and northern Italy, even though the
formal frameworks are similar. A further complication is that which institutions
matter will depend on a region’s specialization; the institutions most relevant to
rural agriculture may differ from the institutions most relevant to urban firms,
for example. Using surveys of public employees in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile,
Gingerich (2013) shows that perceived effectiveness varies across different gov-
ernment agencies within these countries.
Further, the nature of the political economy will vary across regions. This
could include the extent to which local elections are free and fair, the extent
of control exerted by local elites, and the effectiveness of the rule of law and
the judiciary. There is now a large literature examining variation in political
economy at the sub-national level, with Besley and Burgess (2002) and Baland
and Robinson (2008) as just two examples. Many instances of ‘sub-national au-
thoritarianism’ have been documented for democracies in developing countries
and transition economies; for example, the dominance of sub-national govern-
ment by single parties was a feature of the US South until the later part of the
twentieth century (see Gibson 2005). Through these mechanisms, there could be
significant variation across regions in the quality of government, the provision
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of local public goods, and in the rule of law and contract enforcement.
Local institutions will be a determinant of the comparative advantage of re-
gions, in the same way that national institutions appear to shape the compar-
ative advantage of countries (for example, Nunn 2007). One way in which the
regional context differs is that individuals have considerable scope to relocate.
Hence, when local public goods and amenities are better in some areas than
others, and valued by individuals, migration across regions will take place until
these advantages are offset by congestion — more intensive use of amenities —
or higher living costs, such as housing costs. Similarly, firms that use local public
goods intensively will tend to relocate to regions that provide these goods effect-
ively. Hence, variation in local institutions will influence regional prosperity and
population density.
In the past, the study of these effects has been hampered by the lack of data
on institutional variation at the local level. The leading approach has been to
study natural experiments. The well-known study by Banerjee and Iyer (2005)
look at a variety of outcomes across Indian districts, notably agricultural invest-
ments and productivity, and relates them to historical variation in land rights un-
der British rule in the nineteenth century. Banerjee and Iyer find that outcomes
have diverged: those districts where land rights were given to landlords rather
than cultivators have significantly worse outcomes in the post-independence
period. Some of the divergence takes place relatively late, in 1965-80, which
they attribute to the varying political trajectories of (historically) landlord and
non-landlord districts. Their leading explanation is that, in districts where land
rights were given to landlords, this led to a class-based and antagonistic politics,
with consequences for policy priorities and public investment that have persisted
for many decades. The results indicate that regional variation in public invest-
ment and development expenditure can make a material difference to outcomes
at the sub-national level. It also seems clear that variation in local institutions
and political trajectories have long-lived effects on regional outcomes. Further
work on India by Iyer (2010), exploiting exogenous variation in direct British
colonial rule versus indirect rule, reaches similar conclusions: areas that were
under direct rule continued to have higher levels of poverty and infant mortality
well into the post-colonial period.
Along similar lines, Naritomi et al. (2012) study local institutions in Brazil,
finding that institutional quality and the distribution of land have been influ-
enced by the distinct colonial histories of different regions. Acemoglu, García-
Jimeno and Robinson (2012) study Colombia, identifying persistent effects of
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slavery on various outcomes, exploiting spatial variation in slavery associated
with the presence of gold mines during the seventeenth and eighteenth centur-
ies. Dell (2010) finds similarly long-lived effects of a forced labour scheme in
Peru, the ‘mita’. The identification strategy is a spatial discontinuity design,
based on comparing outcomes either side of a section of the geographic bound-
ary of the affected area. Although the scheme was abolished in 1812, Dell estab-
lishes that its effects can still be seen today in substantially lower consumption
levels, a greater incidence of child stunting, and greater prevalence of subsist-
ence farming in the affected districts. She argues that these effects arose because
the mita districts followed a different political trajectory, based on communal
land tenure, compared to non-mita districts. The latter provided a more stable
land tenure system that encouraged public goods provision, including educa-
tion. The main results show how local institutions can have long-lived effects on
spatial disparities. Moreover, these disparities seem to correspond to differences
in life chances and opportunities that have not been eliminated by the possibility
of migration between regions, even over many decades.
Further evidence of the long reach of history comes from the innovative study
of Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), briefly mentioned earlier. They study
the relationship between contemporary sub-national development in Africa and
measures of pre-colonial political centralization, where the latter reflect the ex-
tent of levels of political jurisdictions above the local (village) level. The initial
results are based on a sample of roughly 500-700 geographic units. The measure
of contemporary development is derived from satellite data on light density at
night; this also allows a higher-resolution analysis of around 66,000 geographic
units. Further, they also compare light density across contiguous ethnic home-
lands of groups that differ in their traditions of political centralization. The
results consistently suggest that differences in light density, and hence in the
density of contemporary economic activity, are related to long-standing differ-
ences in institutional traditions: areas with traditions of political hierarchy have
higher development levels. As they note, the data on light density open up many
further research possibilities.
In the literature to date, the leading sceptics are Gennaioli et al. (2013a) and
Mitton (2013). To explore the question, Gennaioli et al. run a simple regression
of regional GDP per capita on country dummies and a proxy for economic insti-
tutions constructed from sub-national data extracted from the Enterprise Survey
and Doing Business reports; there are 496 regional-level observations, across 79
countries. They find that, although there is significant regional variation in their
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institutions measure, it explains very little of the regional variation in GDP per
capita. Mitton (2013) obtains similar results. It is not clear how to reconcile their
findings with the studies based on natural experiments, although the latter give
more emphasis to political institutions (as opposed to economic institutions) and
exploit exogenous variation. One possible story is that perceptions of institutions
depend on a region’s specialization. It might also be that measured variation in
economic institutions is endogenous and linked to the scope for corruption and
the politicization of economic activity, which could be greater in richer or more
industrialized regions. Gennaioli et al. (2013a, p. 128) note that, on average,
economic institutions are perceived as weaker in a country’s richest region than
in its poorest. Nevertheless, these explanations are speculative, and a good in-
strument for sub-national variation in economic institutions seems unlikely to
emerge.
7.6 Culture and social norms
The sub-national variation in cultural and social norms, and social capital, has
also been studied. The concept of social capital often lacks well-defined bound-
aries, but partly because of this, it is a useful umbrella term for social norms such
as trust and civic engagement. A contemporary economist might also consider
the density of social networks, and the quality of the links within them. Much
of the recent interest in social capital can be attributed to the work of Putnam
(1993), who contrasted the levels of trust and civic participation between regions
of Italy, and argued that these differences in social norms had far-reaching con-
sequences, partly acting through political outcomes.
Using regional data for Europe, Tabellini (2010) analyzes the relationship
between regional incomes (and growth rates) and measures of cultural norms,
such as trust, respect for others, and respect for individual independence and
autonomy. His study includes country fixed effects and instruments the cultural
variables using long-run historical data, nineteenth-century literacy rates and
early (1600-1850) political institutions, both measured at the regional level.36
His results suggest that, although the regions within each country have long
shared the same formal institutions, historical data help to explain contemporary
outcomes, with the effects mediated by cultural and social norms. The tenor
of these findings is consistent with Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Dell (2010),
suggesting that regional outcomes can often be traced back many decades.
36It should be noted, however, that the political institutions measure has only limited measured
variation within some countries.
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Within Russia, Acemoglu, Hassan and Robinson (2011) find long-run effects
of the persecution, displacement and mass murder of Jews by the Nazis dur-
ing World War II; the cities where this was most intense have grown relatively
slowly, and show greater support for communist politicians. The administrative
districts (oblasts) most affected have lower average wages and income per capita.
Acemoglu et al. attribute these effects to the changes in social structure brought
by the Holocaust.
Other work on social norms uses variation at borders. For example, Becker
and Boeckh (2011) study communities in Eastern Europe either side of the bor-
der of the former Habsburg Empire. Using survey data for 2006, they find
that historical affiliation of an area with the Empire is associated with higher
trust and less corruption in courts and the police, even though the Empire was
broken up almost a century ago, in 1918. Along similar lines, Grosfeld and
Zhuravskaya (2012) use the historical partition of Poland among three Empires
- Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia - and find effects either side of former
borders on religious beliefs, voting patterns, and political beliefs, including sup-
port for democracy. Again, it is natural to think that some of these differences
would have implications for the spatial pattern of activity, and also interesting
that spatial differences in culture and social norms can persist for decades.
One natural question is whether religious differences influence regional out-
comes. Using data on the counties of Prussia in the late nineteenth century,
Becker and Woessmann (2009) find that Protestant counties are relatively pros-
perous, and attribute this to higher levels of literacy prompted by Luther’s em-
phasis on schooling. In contrast, Cantoni (2010) exploits religious variation
across the German lands of the Holy Roman Empire; using data on popula-
tions for 272 cities over 1300-1900, he finds that the paths taken by Catholic and
Protestant cities and regions are virtually indistinguishable.
The literature we have reviewed emphasizes differences across regions in cul-
tural and social norms. A less obvious argument is that differences across coun-
tries could influence the agglomeration process. For example, patterns of labour
mobility may differ between societies that are relatively atomistic and individu-
alistic, and those where close family ties are especially valued. Duranton et al.
(2009) establish some interesting associations between historical family types,
classified for medieval Europe, and variation in outcomes within countries. In-
vestigating such hypotheses across countries is not straightforward, however: a
cross-section analysis is limited by the small number of countries in the world,
and a panel data analysis by the lack of time-series variation in cultural norms.
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Nevertheless, the importance of social ties is worth stressing. Economists
often emphasize the benefits of mobility, and fluid economic arrangements are
seen as important for efficiency. But a highly mobile labour force is also one
in which networks of family, friends and neighbourhood connections are re-
peatedly disrupted. Most of the theoretical models present a society that is
atomized by construction, and there are no frictions that arise from ties to fam-
ily and friends. It is possible that such a world could exist, but few of us would
want to live there.
Recent empirical work by Belot and Ermisch (2009) and Dahl and Sorenson
(2010) indicates the potential importance of social ties to location decisions. This
raises the possibility of nonpecuniary externalities to mobility that are not al-
ways acknowledged. The social capital perspective complicates the picture still
further: Sennett (1998) raised concerns that a modern, highly-educated work-
force may be mobile, but also rootless and rarely socially engaged. More broadly,
economic adjustments across regions and cities are likely to have cultural and
social consequences, changing the character of areas in unpredictable ways.37
These considerations are hard to define, and might seem a topic for sociolo-
gists rather than economists, but for the inconvenient fact that welfare effects
sometimes involve non-economic mechanisms.
7.7 Entrepreneurship, skills and ideas
The role of entrepreneurship in prosperity is one of the most vexed questions
in regional economics. Glaeser et al. (2010) open their discussion with the fol-
lowing questions: can the economic history of Detroit be told without Henry
Ford and Alfred Sloan? Would Ford have achieved the same success if he
had worked in Houston? Would Silicon Valley have experienced its remark-
able growth without Frederick Terman and William Shockley? These questions
hint at some degree of indeterminacy in the evolution of regional specialization
and prosperity. They seem to open the way to a ‘Great Man’ approach in which,
to misquote Thomas Carlyle, the history of regions is nothing but the biography
of great men and women.
As in the more general study of history, this idea is unsettling. Taken to its
extreme, it radically undermines attempts to generalize about regional growth.
But equally clearly, there are limits on the extent to which individuals (and indi-
vidual companies) can be decisive; Silicon Valley was more likely to take shape
37As an example, Solnit (2013) provides a brief account of contemporary San Francisco which
emphasizes the losses that can accrue as employment patterns and living costs change.
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in California than Alaska. These considerations suggest that the idea of entre-
preneurship should be invoked by historians and economists in rather different
ways. The historian of a region might want to draw heavily on what Klepper
(2011) terms ‘nano-economics’, the study of specific companies and entrepren-
eurs, their spin-off companies, and other legacies. This endeavour would have
lessons for the study of regional prosperity, but is not coterminous with it. Eco-
nomists will typically want to think about models in which entrepreneurship is
an outcome or mechanism within a much larger process. Put differently, explain-
ing what happened in retrospect (to Detroit, or Silicon Valley) is not the same
exercise as understanding how entrepreneurship shapes regional prosperity in
general, even if there is some overlap.
This hints at some difficulty in framing the relevant research questions. Glaeser
et al. (2010) argue that entrepreneurs will play a crucial role in the extent to
which cities and regions are economically dynamic, and they survey some of
the literature in this area. They emphasize that many of the forces which could
drive agglomeration - spatial differences in input availability, access to ideas,
and local culture or institutions - will also influence the extent of entrepreneur-
ship. We note a corollary: seeking to quantify ‘the’ effect of entrepreneurship on
regional prosperity makes little more sense than seeking to quantify the effect
of agglomeration. Serious empirical work on entrepreneurship has to contend
with its endogeneity to a range of economic and social forces, and this helps to
explain why there is not more work on the topic.
Progress might depend on ingenious use of natural experiments, with Glaeser
et al. (2012) as a leading example. They argue that, in the US, areas close to
mines were more likely to specialize in industries like steel, with significant
scale economies and dominated by large firms; as a result, the conditions for
entrepreneurship were less likely to arise. They find that proximity to historical
mining deposits (in 1900) is indeed associated with larger firms and fewer start-
ups decades later, and use this proximity as an instrument for entrepreneurship.
Across cities, entrepreneurship is strongly associated with faster employment
growth even in IV estimates.
Entrepreneurship plays a central role in the structural model of Gennaioli
et al. (2013a), discussed in section 4.3 above. Individuals can choose between
employment and entrepreneurship; more able individuals self-select into entre-
preneurship and, as in Lucas (1978), especially able entrepreneurs run larger
and more productive firms. The most important empirical consequence is that
human capital formation is placed centre-stage, as a source of highly-able indi-
79
viduals; and traditional Mincerian wage regressions, or development account-
ing exercises, risk understating the effect of schooling on regional prosperity,
because some of the returns to schooling are reflected in capital income rather
than wages. Felkner and Townsend (2011) also construct an occupational choice
model with a role for entrepreneurship, but emphasizing the role of local access
to finance; they simulate the model on detailed data for Thailand, and compare
the paths taken by spatial enterprise concentration with those seen in the data.
The model in Gennaioli et al. (2013a) is essentially static, and designed to ex-
plain outcomes in a cross-section of regions. But one reason for being interested
in entrepreneurship is that it may help to explain why some regions success-
fully reinvent themselves, while others lose dynamism. It is also related to ideas
about information transmission and the extent to which individuals and firms
are linked through various networks; this suggests the benefits of integrating
the analysis of regions with ideas from urban economics. Glaeser and Gottlieb
(2009) argue that, to be successful, modern cities increasingly depend on the
links between urban density and the transmission of ideas. For some countries,
the spatial concentration of the highly-skilled is likely to be increasing; Moretti
(2012) argues this for the US.38
Particular instances of entrepreneurship, firm entry, and the concentration
of skilled workers in particular locations, are often thought to be associated
with universities, as in Stanford’s influence on Silicon Valley, or the cluster of
technology companies around Cambridge in the UK. Traditionally, the study of
some of the effects of universities has drawn on the local multipliers and impact
assessments developed in the regional science literature.39 But quantifying the
wider benefits of universities for the local transmission of ideas, innovation, firm
entry, or the ‘creative classes’ of Florida (2002) is even harder.
Universities are not randomly assigned across locations, and natural experi-
ments are hard to find. Moretti (2004) studies the social returns to education in
the US, partly by using the land-grant colleges of 1862 and 1890 to instrument
for differences in the share of college graduates across cities. He finds that a
higher college share not only increases the wages of less-educated workers, but
also those of the well-educated, consistent with a role for human capital extern-
alities. An alternative approach is to use more detailed data, perhaps at the
38See also Ganong and Shoag (2013) for further discussion and references.
39Armstrong and Taylor (2000) includes an introduction to these approaches, acknowledging
some important objections. Using, instead, an econometric approach to local multipliers, Moretti
(2010) finds that one additional skilled job in the traded sector will generate 2.5 jobs in providing
goods and services.
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establishment level, to study particular mechanisms; for example, Abramovsky
et al. (2007) find that business R&D in the UK is sometimes located close to
highly-ranked university research departments in related disciplines.
7.8 Local financial development
Does local financial development matter? In a well-known paper, Jayaratne and
Strahan (1996) used data on US states to study the effects of bank deregulation
on economic growth. Most US states began the 1970s with restrictions on the
expansion of bank branches within and across state borders; over the following
twenty-five years, the majority of these states eliminated or loosened the con-
trols. Using an empirical model with state fixed effects, Jayaratne and Strahan
find that branching deregulation significantly increased the growth rate of state
personal income per capita and gross state product per capita. The evidence that
this was achieved by a greater volume of commercial lending is not strong. In-
stead, the lifting of branching restrictions seems to have resulted in a lower share
of non-performing loans in the state total, and a lower share of loans being writ-
ten off each year. This evidence on the quality of lending is not conclusive, since
the loan portfolios of banks may have changed in their size composition and in
the riskiness of borrowers. Nevertheless, the paper suggests that local financial
intermediation can influence regional prosperity.
More recently, the same policy reform has been revisited by Huang (2008)
using a spatial discontinuity design. He compares performance across pairs of
contiguous counties either side of a state border, where one county is affected
by deregulation earlier than the other. This approach allows for heterogeneity in
treatment effects over time and across states. The evidence that deregulation had
economic benefits seems noticeably weaker than in the Jayaratne and Strahan
study, although it is not clear whether the alternative approach to identification
has led to more reliable estimates, or just to greater imprecision. The results do
not appear to be driven by spillovers of deregulation across borders, since Huang
also compares outcomes using ‘hinterland’ counties within the still-regulated
states, further from the border. He emphasizes that the instances of significant
growth accelerations in his study all occur relatively late in the reform process,
after 1985, and interprets this in terms of ‘learning by observing’, so that states
which liberalized later tended to have better outcomes on average.
For those developed countries without restrictions on inter-regional lending
or spatial variation in regulation, a sceptic might argue that local financial de-
velopment cannot matter. Comparing regions of Italy, Guiso et al. (2004) find
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evidence that it does: for example, the ratio of new firms to population is 25
percent higher in the most financially developed Italian region, compared to the
least. Their study exploits a 1936 banking law, which had persistent effects on the
number of bank branches, and can be used as an instrument for the exogenous
supply of credit. Natural experiments have also been found in other countries.
In a study based on Russian data, Berkowitz et al. (2012) use regional vari-
ation in banking that arose at the end of the Soviet era, and its establishment of
specialized banks (‘spetsbanks’). They find that the presence of the spetsbanks
increased within-region lending to firms and individuals, but had no discern-
ible effect on income per capita. Regions with spetsbanks are associated with
increased employment rates, however.
Chen et al. (2010) study venture capital in the US, noting that venture capital
firms, and venture-capital-financed companies, are heavily concentrated in just
three metropolitan areas (Boston, New York and San Francisco). They associ-
ate this with localized knowledge spillovers in sectors especially likely to draw
on venture capital; with localized knowledge spillovers across venture capital
firms; and with entrepreneurs that seek finance from previously-successful ven-
ture capital firms. These features could lead to a virtuous circle as entrepreneurs
locate businesses close to funding sources, and other venture capital firms enter
at the same location; conversely, other regions may experience a vicious circle.
Chen et al. suggest that policies which increase the number of venture-backed
investments in a region will increase the chances of venture capital firms estab-
lishing offices in that region.
For developing countries, there are complicating factors, not least the close
connections between the banking sector and the state that are found in some
countries. China is an important example: Démurger et al. (2002) argue in-
formally that the monopoly state banking system has contributed to regional
inequality, by limiting access to external finance in the interior provinces and
by assigning priority for lending to the state-owned enterprises in the coastal
and north-eastern regions. For India, Burgess and Pande (2005) investigate the
effects of a large state-led expansion in bank branches in rural areas; they find
that it increased deposit mobilization and lending, and lowered rural poverty.
Fafchamps and Schündeln (2013) study local financial development in Morocco,
at a lower level of aggregation, corresponding roughly to a city or county: they
find that access to a bank increases firm entry, raises firm growth, and lowers
the likelihood of firm exit.
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7.9 Other policies and regulations
We have already discussed some well-known papers on specific policies and
regulations. One approach to local policy variation uses spatial discontinuity
designs, as in the paper by Holmes (1998) reviewed in section 6.5 above. A more
recent example is the work of Duranton et al. (2011) on local taxation, based
on pairing establishments across borders in the UK. But the literature on local
and regional policies in developed countries is sufficiently extensive to require a
dedicated survey of its own, which space does not permit.
Instead, we briefly review some evidence for developing countries, much of
it based on the states of India. The case of India is interesting because policies
and regulations have varied across states and over time. Aghion et al. (2008)
study the effects of dismantling the License Raj, a 1951 system of controls that
regulated entry and production in the formal manufacturing sector. The elimin-
ation of these barriers to investment and entry affected states differently: those
industries in states with pro-employer labour market institutions grew faster
than those in states with pro-worker institutions. Since pro-worker institutions
seem to be directly associated with weaker industrial performance, the overall
effect of de-licensing was to increase the disadvantages of states with pro-worker
labour market institutions. Earlier, the panel data study of Besley and Burgess
(2004) had already found that pro-worker labour market regulation was associ-
ated with lower output, employment, investment and productivity in the formal
manufacturing sector; higher output in the informal sector; and higher rates of
urban poverty.
Besley and Burgess remark that, in this case, specific attempts to redress the
balance of power between capital and labour seem to have worked against the
interests of the poor. Their earlier panel data study, Besley and Burgess (2000),
examined an alternative redistributive policy, land reform. They find that re-
forms which changed the terms of land contracts lowered poverty and raised
agricultural wages, although this may have been accompanied by lower average
income. Implementing land reform had a poverty-reducing effect equivalent to
growth in income per capita of around 10 percent. Since the estimated effects
vary with the exact type of land reform, a further lesson of their study is that
the specific details of a policy intervention can matter a great deal. A remain-
ing question raised by these papers, not straightforward to answer, is the effect
of policy variation on regional disparities when states are linked in a spatial
equilibrium. Although labour mobility across Indian states is likely to be low,
entrepreneurs and firms must still decide where to locate, and agglomeration
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and growth can be determined jointly even when labour is immobile.
Policies can also influence regional TFP through their effect on factor mis-
allocation. For example, Brandt et al. (2013) study distortions within China,
and find that most of their estimated within-province distortions are due to the
misallocation of capital between the state and the non-state sectors; this misal-
location lowers province-level TFP. For China, there has also been some work on
policy-induced barriers to trade between provinces; see Young (2000) and Holz
(2009) for alternative views on their importance.
7.10 Conflict
For some countries, localized conflict can influence the relative prosperity of re-
gions, both in the short run and in ways that unfold over time. India’s class con-
flicts take their most extreme form in the ‘Naxalite’ or Maoist peasant uprisings,
which affect the Red Corridor within eastern states.40 The affected states are
among the poorest in the country, but since economic and political outcomes are
jointly determined, identifying the causal effect of conflict is difficult. Compar-
ing Indonesian provinces, Hill et al. (2008) suggest that conflict has been a factor
in the slow growth of Maluku and, to a lesser extent, resource-rich Aceh; rel-
evant to the latter, Morelli and Rohner (2010) examine the relationship between
the spatial distribution of natural resources and the risk of conflict, including the
rise of secessionist movements.
One approach to recovering a causal effect is that of Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003). They use their synthetic control method, reviewed in section 6.6 above,
to study the effect of Basque terrorism. They find that it reduced GDP per capita
in the Basque Country, relative to a synthetic control region without terrorism,
by ten percentage points.41
Another branch of the literature studies the effect of wartime destruction
on the spatial distribution of population, or the relative outcomes of affected
regions. The aim is not to investigate the overall humanitarian or economic costs
of conflict or war, but to see whether past (localized) destruction influences later
regional outcomes. Two well-known studies consider the effects of World War II
bombing, by Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Brakman et al. (2004b); the former
was briefly discussed in section 7.1 above, and both are reviewed in detail in
40Banerjee and Iyer (2005) note that the regions most associated with this conflict are areas
where landlord-based systems were implemented under British rule.
41As well as the synthetic control method, they also used an event study of the stock prices of
firms significantly exposed to the Basque Country, to show that these stock prices outperformed
when the 1998-99 ceasefire became credible, and underperformed at the end of the ceasefire.
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Brakman et al. (2009). Their review concludes that some shocks had permanent
effects, consistent with models of agglomeration in which there are multiple
equilibria and path dependence.
Miguel and Roland (2011) study the long-term regional effects of the US
bombing of Vietnam, noting that it was heavily concentrated in a subset of their
584 sample districts, and hence with scope for differential effects across regions.
They find that districts heavily bombed between 1965 and 1975 had moderately
lower consumption (compared to other districts) in 1992-3, but this effect had
disappeared by 2002; nor do they find significant long-run effects on the relative
poverty rates, electricity infrastructure, literacy, or population density of the af-
fected areas. A complicating factor is that the Vietnamese government undertook
major reconstruction efforts; but otherwise, the findings indicate that long-run
patterns of spatial activity are largely independent even of damaging bombing
campaigns. Miguel and Roland interpret this as evidence against simple models
of regional poverty traps.
8 Regional Decline
One of the simplest points about regional economics is also one of the most
fundamental. The invisible hand is more active at some times and places than
others, and once distinct points in space are introduced into economic theory,
the conventional arguments that markets can be Pareto-efficient no longer apply.
Markets, left to themselves, can establish patterns of regional growth and decline
that involve many economic and social costs. One of the best reasons to study
regional growth might be to learn how to forestall or reverse regional decline.
In this section, we discuss some of the processes involved in decline. Its ana-
lysis is partly the obverse of regional growth; for example, the results of Holmes
(1998) tell us not only about the growth of US states with pro-business policies,
but also the relative decline of states without them. Similarly, the evolution of
location-specific advantages, such as market access, can explain decline as well
as growth. Yoon (2013) argues that reductions in local advantages help to explain
the decline of the US Rust Belt, compounded by a reversal of agglomeration and
a decline in the quality of local public goods. This perhaps hints that decline
raises specific issues of its own, which have been under-researched. Our treat-
ment will be relatively discursive and speculative, emphasizing areas for future
research rather than drawing heavily on existing work.
What do we mean by decline, and does it matter? Regions could be declining
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in terms of absolute or (more often) relative living standards and welfare indic-
ators, but also in terms of absolute or relative population, since one response to
economic decline will be out-migration and diverted in-migration. This second
kind of decline is often a symptom of the first, but has interest in itself, as a
distinct process. In the US, a country usually judged to have high labour mobil-
ity, it is perhaps not surprising that the primary response to the Dust Bowl was
out-migration (Hornbeck 2012). Similarly, the Rust Belt has seen its share of the
US population decline.
With few exceptions, economists generally take a benign view of factor mo-
bility, and see it as a powerful equilibrating force. It is true that out-migration
will sometimes benefit both migrants and those who remain behind, but this is
not inevitable. In other ways it has the potential to compound the problems of a
declining region, as Myrdal (1957) discussed. One complicating factor is select-
ive migration; those who leave a declining region will often be the young and
well-educated. Even in the absence of conventional human capital externalities,
this form of out-migration could be self-reinforcing, and have social and political
consequences for the declining region.42 This is not to deny, as Myrdal seems
to have done, that the logic of a spatial equilibrium will reassert itself. But the
process of reaching it may involve significant costs, especially where the decline
is absolute rather than relative.
The New Economic Geography literature has investigated decline in terms of
the combined effects of changes in inter-regional trade costs and assumptions on
labour mobility. In Puga (1999), when trade costs are high, industrial activity is
dispersed. If trade costs fall, this promotes the agglomeration of activities with
increasing returns. This is compounded by migration, implying the relative (and
perhaps absolute) decline of some regions. But if workers do not move across
regions, then as trade costs fall further, firms become increasingly sensitive to
cost differentials across regions, and industry will spread out once more. Nocco
(2005) considers a variant of this model with a role for knowledge spillovers
across regions. A natural question is whether agglomeration is optimal; to con-
sider this, Ottaviano and Thisse (2002) study a two-region economy with skilled
workers that are mobile, and unskilled workers that are not. Market forces lead
to the optimal outcome when trade costs are high or low, but for intermedi-
42In some ways, points such as these — the limitations and constraints on migration as an
equilibrating force — have been better understood in the literature on developing countries.
Lipton (1980, p.15) writes that it is ‘perfectly consistent to claim, as I do, that the migrant on
average gains from migration, but the village he leaves behind loses’. See also Kanbur and
Rapoport (2005).
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ate levels of trade costs, agglomeration takes place when dispersion is socially
desirable.
When regional decline is discussed, an idea often heard is that policy-makers
should seek to protect people rather than places. Some economists seem to take
the view that, if out-migration is taking place, so be it. But this view risks leaving
too much out. Some consequences of a region ‘emptying out’ are inefficient, and
involve multiple externalities. Infrastructure and social overhead capital will be
written off or less well utilized, and the local tax base eroded. Movements of
population to other areas will require new investment and increase demands on
local public goods. Declining regions are likely to become low-trust, high-crime
regions. Most of these outcomes will not be internalized by migrants, and it is
often hard to see anything creative in the destruction of social capital.
As a practical matter, there is a large literature on regional policy, understood
as a response to decline, whether in terms of relative economic position, or
sustained out-migration. But one constraint on this literature is that some of the
mechanisms underlying decline, such as crime, social unrest and local political
consequences, are complex. There is also a risk that regional policy could be too
reactive. Once decline is under way, disadvantages can accumulate, and may
be hard to reverse. Anticipation of regional decline could even be self-fulfilling,
which again suggests the need to consider regional problems in dynamic terms.
On the basis that prevention is better than cure, one issue for policy will be
a given region’s extent of diversification, and hence its robustness to shocks.
But, at the risk of labouring the obvious, there is no good reason to expect that
decentralized markets will lead to the optimal degree of diversification, not least
given the many externalities involved. This in itself could justify some degree of
intervention.
To emphasize the lack of diversification of, say, 1960s Detroit could seem a
little too easy, a form of retrospective wisdom. After all, not many are currently
calling for Silicon Valley to diversify. But as Glaeser (2011) emphasizes, Detroit’s
problem was that its fortunes were closely tied not just to a small number of
sectors but to a small number of firms, the ‘Big Three’ of Chrysler, Ford and
General Motors; to an uncomfortable extent, Detroit was a three-company town.
The quantitative exercise of Alder et al. (2013) attributes much of the Rust Belt’s
wider decline to a lack of competition and powerful unions.43 A related per-
spective could draw on Gabaix (2011), who argues that idiosyncratic shocks to
43See also Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013a) for a quantitative account of the declining
populations of Rust Belt cities, partly in terms of relatively large local frictions.
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large firms can account for aggregate business cycle fluctuations to a significant
degree. This same idea of the ‘granularity’ of economic activity could also be ap-
plied to regional growth and regional decline, and may be especially important
for relatively small countries.
Another, closely related, lesson of Detroit might be the potential for path de-
pendence, or regional ‘lock in’, a theme of some recent work by geographers.
Specialization is an endogenous outcome, the consequences of which unfold
over time, and that interact with later shocks. Klepper (2010) argues that the
post-war development of Detroit - and that of Silicon Valley - was partly driven
by successful spinoffs from high achieving firms, and ‘organizational reproduc-
tion’. A natural corollary is that, in the long term, success in narrowly-defined
areas could crowd out other entrepreneurial activities (Glaeser et al. 2010). A
city or region could become locked in to particular sectors or lines of activity,
bringing the risk of future decline. Martin and Sunley (2006) discuss work on
path dependence in more detail, emphasizing that not much is know about why
some regional economies lose dynamism, while others evolve and continually
reinvent themselves.
Some argue that the solution to regional decline is to promote clusters of
firms in particular sectors. The practical importance of clusters, as a source of
higher productivity or a response to regional decline, continues to divide opin-
ion.44 The work of Klepper (2010) implies that understanding specific industrial
clusters requires detailed attention to their genealogy. The most famous ex-
amples appear to have developed in a largely organic way, rather than through
external intervention; there is room for debate over whether pro-cluster policies
would be effective, even if desirable.
It might be easier to achieve consensus when the analysis of regional decline
focuses on the labour market. Kline and Moretti (2013) discuss the possibility
of hiring subsidies that vary across locations, as a candidate place-based policy.
An alternative approach emphasizes the potential benefits of local ownership:
the argument is partly that locally-owned firms are less likely to reduce employ-
ment in the face of negative shocks. Kolko and Neumark (2010) investigate this
hypothesis for the US, finding that the greatest benefits come not from small
independent businesses but corporate headquarters, followed by locally-owned
chains. A different place-based policy adopted by some countries, including the
UK, is to locate public sector offices in depressed regions. Again, this may help
to promote stability, although a general equilibrium analysis is needed.
44See Duranton (2011) for an especially sceptical view.
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These observations point to the importance of studying regional decline in
more depth. In the meantime, reading Adam Smith, or for that matter most con-
temporary textbooks in economics, would provide little assistance to the citizens
of cities and regions that confront decline. Their problems deserve more atten-
tion from economists. Until this happens, the mechanisms and costs of decline
will be comprehended deeply only by those directly involved, and with much
to lose. What the invisible hand gives, it can also take away.
9 Conclusions
The study of regional growth is often thought to be simpler and more straight-
forward than national growth. We have emphasized, instead, various ways in
which it is harder. Regional outcomes are best seen in terms of a spatial equi-
librium. Regions are interdependent, and their locations matter. For example,
theoretical models predict that market access influences relative prosperity and
population density, and these predictions are supported by a variety of evid-
ence. Meanwhile, labour mobility implies that incomes, populations and living
costs are all endogenous, and must be considered jointly. The days when a text-
book on regional economics could legitimately base most of its discussion on the
neoclassical growth model are gone.
Some of the other inheritances from the cross-country literature have been
problematic. Many empirical studies treat the observations on regional units as
if they derived from independent entities. But with regional outcomes tightly
linked in various ways, it is rarely straightforward to identify causal effects from
regional data, or to relate the estimated effects to underlying quantities of in-
terest. For example, in the regression-based studies, it is rarely clear how to
interpret the estimated effects of a given variable on productivity or growth.
Do these estimates hold constant the spatial distribution of population and eco-
nomic activity, or do they partly reflect endogenous changes in agglomeration?
This distinction becomes especially important whenever a researcher seeks to
draw lessons for national growth, or regional policies. The problem can be seen
with an extreme example. If one region gains from a specific policy only by ex-
panding at the expense of another, any analysis which implicitly holds fixed the
spatial distributions of population and activity will be misleading about welfare
effects. The arithmetic of regional policy is complicated, and what is an addition
for one region may be subtraction from another, even when the policy aimed
at multiplication. As elsewhere in the study of regional data, the quantitative
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application of structural models seems the most promising response.
We have also tried to highlight some areas where additional research seems
especially needed. When economists consider the possibility of a regional prob-
lem, they typically examine disparities in average living standards, and their
evolution over time. The empirical literature on this topic is vast. Yet some
of the most important regional problems are likely to be those where areas are
persistently losing population. We have emphasized that regional decline, con-
ceived in these terms, is likely to be a distinct process, and one that has rarely
been studied by economists.
In passing, we have also drawn attention to some of the burdens of adjust-
ment, such as the non-pecuniary externalities that can arise through mobility.
Formal models sometimes indicate that even modest economic changes, with
similarly modest welfare effects, involve substantial redistributions of popula-
tion and economic activity. One possible conjecture is that a market economy
may sometimes involve ‘too much’ ongoing relocation. Limiting mobility is
rarely attractive, however. A more promising avenue would be to investigate
forms of economic arrangements that lessen the need for mobility in the first
place.
We will not attempt even a short summary of the forces that influence re-
gional growth. Too much remains uncertain, and it is a sign of the current
health of the literature that any such survey would quickly become dated. In-
stead, we have emphasized recent developments in the study of regional growth,
both theoretical and empirical. As well as the impetus from the New Economic
Geography literature, the increasing availability of (and interest in) regional data
sets mean that the field is evolving at a great pace. Methods such as spatial dis-
continuity designs and the use of natural experiments have shed new light on
causal effects, while the quantitative application of structural models is likely
to be highly informative. Combined, these developments suggest that regional
growth has become a particularly exciting area of economics, rich in data, inter-
esting research questions, new methods, and increasingly sophisticated models.
The study of growth has belatedly entered its own Space Age, and there is no
going back.
10 Appendix: data and methods
This appendix discusses regional price deflators; criticisms of the beta conver-
gence approach; and some alternative methods for studying regional growth.
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10.1 Regional price deflators
Within countries, prices for identical goods often differ across locations. Ideally,
it would be possible to compare output and income across regions in real terms,
in the same way that the Penn World Table allows comparisons of real output
across countries. Accurate comparisons of output or productivity across regions
require PPP deflators or measures of regional output that aggregate goods and
services at a common set of prices (such as producer or ‘mill’ prices). Similarly,
for the study of differences in the standard of living across regions, it would be
useful to have cost-of-living deflators, partly based on housing costs.
In practice, real comparisons of regional output are rarely possible over long
spans of time; only a few countries, including Canada and China, release data
which allow for price differences across provinces. Sometimes, deflators may
be available for just a few points in time. Aten (2008) and Aten and D’Souza
(2008) have undertaken this for the US. The cross-country, cross-section data set
of Mitton (2013) adjusts for some differences across regions in the cost of liv-
ing, by linking regions to data on living costs for particular cities. More gener-
ally, measures of regional inequality can adjust for price differences at particular
dates, but in principle, a researcher studying regional growth and convergence
needs deflators for each date.
This makes it important to consider the main influences on regional price
levels, and their variation over time. If labour is homogeneous and mobile, a
spatial equilibrium requires real incomes to be equalized across locations; in
that case, regions with higher nominal wages must have higher price levels for
goods and services, and/or higher housing costs. This result emerges from
general equilibrium models, such as those developed in Redding (2012). In his
analysis, market access also matters: well-connected (less remote) regions will
tend to have relatively low consumer prices for tradable goods. For a migration
equilibrium, this must be offset by a higher population that drives up land prices
and living costs, and hence equalizes real wages.
It seems likely, at least for developed countries, that national statistical agen-
cies already have some of the raw price data needed to construct regional-level
deflators. Deaton and Dupriez (2011) note that the agencies are ‘strangely reti-
cent’ on this topic.45 For prices to be representative of a region, data on the
spatial distribution of population are also needed; but if prices differ across loc-
ations, such data are needed in any case, to derive national-level deflators that
45Nevertheless, work is likely to emerge using disaggregated data on purchases and prices,
from other sources; see Handbury and Weinstein (2011).
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are representative. For cost-of-living deflators, a major component is likely to be
housing costs.
In the absence of official data, an open question is whether empirical re-
searchers could make progress by imputing price levels. One approach to living
costs assumes that households with the same budget share of food, but in dif-
ferent locations, have the same level of welfare; a comparison of their nominal
expenditure levels then reveals the relative price levels at the different locations.
But the key assumption, that households with the same budget share of food
have the same welfare, is strong; see Deaton and Dupriez (2011).
An alternative approach might use simple assumptions about the sensitiv-
ity of price levels to development levels or measures of market access, perhaps
drawing on theoretical models. These relationships could then be used to map
between observable variables and the unobserved true deflators, at least for the
purpose of a sensitivity analysis. One question, which could be studied using
the currently available data, is whether regional deflators are sometimes stable
enough (relative to one another) that growth and convergence studies can give
reliable answers even in their absence. A related question is the extent to which
cost-of-living deflators can proxy for the price levels of output needed for pro-
ductivity comparisons. The results of Redding (2012) suggest that this could be
risky, not least if market access varies widely across locations.
10.2 Beta convergence
In their empirical work on convergence, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 2004) as-
sume that steady-states are similar across regions. This assumption does a lot of
work. It means that an explicit theory of steady-state positions is not required.
From an econometric point of view, it provides a justification for studies of abso-
lute convergence across regions, of the kind they and other authors have carried
out. But in their work, the similarity of steady-states is assumed rather than
established. It seems unattractive on theoretical grounds: in a market economy
with labour mobility, the average product of labour will necessarily vary across
regions, due to composition effects among other forces.
We could still ask whether their approach is informative about the extent of
long-run disparities. One perspective on this is to look at the R2 of an absolute
convergence regression. A typical model would have the form
(yit − yit−τ)/τ = η + βyit−τ + φt + εit (25)
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where yit is the logarithm of output per capita for region i at time t. Sala-i-
Martin (1996) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) argue that estimates of β often
correspond to a convergence rate of around 2% a year. The regressions that
Barro and Sala-i-Martin present for the US states and Japanese prefectures (their
Tables 11.1 and 11.2) often have a relatively low R2 for short subperiods. But
over longer spans of time (1880-2000 for the US, 1930-90 for Japan) their simple
regression has an R2 of 0.92 for both countries. At first glance, this indicates
that steady-state positions are similar. But this is misleading: their regression
omits fixed effects, which could proxy for time-invariant determinants of relative
income levels. In the absence of these fixed effects, it is likely that the parameter
estimates are biased, and the high R2 is misleading.
When the regression (25) is discussed in the literature, β is typically regarded
as the main parameter of interest. For the study of regional growth, we should
be interested in the more general model
(yit − yit−τ)/τ = ηi + βyit−τ + φt + εit (26)
The variance of the region-specific effects (the ηi) will be denoted σ2η , and should
be seen as a key parameter of interest. After taking out the common time effects
φt, the model in (26) implies that region i is mean-reverting with long-run mean
µi = ηi/β. The cross-section variance of µi therefore depends on β2 and also
on σ2η . But also note that, given continued shocks, each region’s output will
continue to vary over time.
For the US, using a fixed effects estimator on ten-year subperiods doubles
the estimated rate of convergence (results not reported). For a large sample of
countries with sub-national data, Gennaioli et al. (2013b) find that including
regional fixed effects greatly increases the estimated rate of convergence. The
assumption in Barro and Sala-i-Martin that σ2η = 0 seems hard to defend. Barro
and Sala-i-Martin provide an alternative justification, which is that yit−τ may
be uncorrelated with ηi. But if the process has been running for any length of
time, this alternative assumption is also unattractive, because a mean-reverting
process such as (26) will necessarily generate a correlation between output per
capita and the fixed effects.
There is another reason for querying this approach. In the cross-country
literature, the process in (26) has a structural justification: it approximates trans-
itional dynamics in the vicinity of a balanced growth path. But for regions, the
neoclassical growth model should not be expected to apply, given inter-regional
flows of capital and labour. Hence, for regional data, (26) is not structural, but
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only a way of capturing the time-series dependence in the data. Instead, Gen-
naioli et al. (2013b) suggest the use of a specification in which each region’s
factor input (perhaps some broad notion of capital) is a Cobb-Douglas function
of its endowment of that factor - based on past investment - and the level that
would obtain under full mobility. As they acknowledge, this assumption is ad
hoc, but it leads to a simple specification which generalizes the standard con-
ditional convergence regression. The extent of the barriers to factor mobility
can be estimated from the data, although their estimates indicate higher barriers
than might have been expected.
Whichever model is adopted, using a single lag may give a misleading pic-
ture. Regional living standards could be influenced by omitted variables which
are themselves autocorrelated, and so eit will be serially correlated. For regional
data, a natural generalization of 26 is:
(yit − yit−τ)/τ = ηi + βyit−τ + φt + uit + εit (27)
uit = ρuit−τ + vit (28)
which implies
(yit − yit−τ)/τ = η′i + (β+ ρ/τ)yit−τ − (βρ+ ρ/τ)yit−2τ + φ′t + vit + εit − ρεit−τ
and makes clear the likely inadequacy of a model with just one lag. There are
further reasons that serial correlation is likely. In the cross-country literature,
the neoclassical growth model can be used to argue that cross-section and time-
series variation in the β parameter should be limited. This seems less plausible
for regions, and the heterogeneity will lead to serially correlated errors. Meas-
urement error, partly due to time-varying regional price levels, could also lead
to serial correlation. These points suggest that beta-convergence regressions,
with or without fixed effects, have significant weaknesses. The remainder of this
appendix considers some alternatives.
10.3 Time series approaches
Recent studies draw heavily on the implications of convergence for the time
series properties of regional data. Bernard and Durlauf (1996) showed how to
relate different concepts of convergence to time series properties. To fix ideas,
94
we will initially consider how a researcher should proceed in the case of two
regions. The choice of the null hypothesis needs thought, and should depend
on the claim that a researcher is interested in seeking to falsify. If the two regions
are believed to be on parallel growth paths, and a researcher wants to see if this
claim can be falsified, a natural approach is to look at their (log) output gap and
apply stationarity tests.
When the regions are genuinely following parallel growth paths, a station-
arity test such as that of Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) should not reject the null
of stationarity. Alternatively, if a researcher wants to examine a claim of diver-
gence, the natural approach is to test whether the output gap contains either a
stochastic trend (using a unit root test) or a deterministic linear time trend (as
when log incomes in the two regions are trend-stationary processes with dif-
ferent trend growth rates).46 Note, however, the maintained assumption that
long-run steady-states are time-invariant, a point we return to shortly.
Extending these ideas to N regions, output gaps could be defined relative to
a particular benchmark region, or a weighted average, as in early work such as
Carlino and Mills (1993, 1996). But this approach becomes problematic if one or
more regions are diverging from the others. The results will vary with the choice
of benchmark, and using a weighted average will indicate non-convergence even
when a subset of regions is moving together. In principle, a more attractive
approach is to allow each region’s growth to be a function of the N − 1 output
gaps with other regions (Carvalho and Harvey 2005). But a flexible version of
this, with separate catch-up coefficients for each ordered pair, implies N(N −
1) parameters and hence becomes difficult or impossible to estimate when the
number of regions is large.47
An attractive alternative is that of Pesaran (2007), who develops a test based
on all N(N − 1)/2 pairwise output gaps. Taking the null of interest to be ‘non-
convergence’, Pesaran shows that under this null, the fraction of pairwise output
gaps for which a unit root is rejected should be close to the size of the unit root
test that has been applied (e.g., 5%). The fraction of pairwise gaps for which
a unit root is rejected can be taken as a measure of the extent of convergence.
46One potential complication here is that convergence could be present but slow, so that the
log output gap is a fractionally integrated process. For a study that includes an application of
this idea to data on the contiguous US states, see Mello (2011).
47A somewhat related approach is to apply multivariate tests for cointegration, such as Jo-
hansen’s method, as in the early study of cross-country convergence by Bernard and Durlauf
(1995). This approach can provide evidence on the number of common stochastic trends likely
to be driving the output movements of the N regions. But again, it becomes infeasible when the
number of regions is large.
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The detailed data on rejections will divide the sample into groups for which
non-convergence is rejected, and regions that are evolving independently. This
is more informative than collapsing the issue to a binary opposition between
convergence and divergence.
Pesaran’s approach has been applied to the contiguous US states by Mello
(2011) and to European regions by Le Pen (2011). The fraction of pairwise gaps
for which a unit root is rejected is typically low, suggesting non-convergence
for the majority of regions, even though other tests provide clear evidence of
mean reversion. In response to these findings, Le Pen (2011) argues for the
importance of structural breaks — that is, mean shifts in the output gaps. But
this highlights a fundamental dilemma for time series approaches. For the tests
to have some power, long spans of data are needed, but then it is harder to
maintain the assumption that relative steady-states are time-invariant. If steady-
states are evolving over time, this breaks the direct connection between time-
series properties and convergence concepts.48
The dilemma arises partly from taking a univariate approach to a process in-
fluenced by a wider range of variables. In the literature on national growth, the
steady-state positions are typically modelled as stable functions of a few vari-
ables, as in Mankiw et al. (1992). This is harder to implement for regional data,
partly because data on potential control variables are often lacking, and partly
because interesting models of regional disparities may not yield simple expres-
sions for steady-states. At least as a way of describing the data, an alternative
approach uses the behavior of the cross-section dispersion (or inequality) in re-
gional income to draw conclusions about the underlying statistical processes.
Evans (1996) showed that if the units such as regions follow independent ran-
dom walks, then the (cross-section) log variance will be integrated of order one
around an upward quadratic trend. If the regions are instead believed to have
converged and to be driven by a common trend, the log variance will be station-
ary and fluctuate around a constant mean.49 This notion of convergence does not
require the cross-section variance to decline monotonically to zero, an outcome
that is unlikely for a collection of stochastic processes. Evans (2000) includes an
application of this idea to the contiguous US states.
Another route is to develop methods for describing growth paths of eco-
48Note that a pairwise output gap process which is stationary, but with mean shifts, is com-
patible with either catching-up or divergence, depending on whether the mean of the output
gap shifts downwards or upwards, respectively. The time series approach then becomes harder
to implement, and interpret.
49For some related discussion, see Ng (2008) and Pesaran (2007).
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nomies that are converging, while separating out long-run effects from cyclical
components, by using unobserved component models. For studies of US conver-
gence that adopt this approach, see Carvalho and Harvey (2005) and Carvalho,
Harvey and Trimbur (2007).
10.4 Distribution dynamics
A popular approach has been ‘distribution dynamics’, developed for cross-country
data by Quah (1993) and applied to regional data by Quah (1996). This approach
characterizes transitions of income per capita between income classes, using a
transition matrix whose elements are the probabilities of moving from one in-
come class to another. There are important ways in which this is more flexible
than a panel data model, and more informative about the underlying process. It
provides direct information about mobility between income classes, and the sta-
tionary distribution implied by a given transition matrix will reveal tendencies
latent in observed realizations of income levels (Quah 1993). Under the strong
assumption that the transition probabilities remain stable over time, the station-
ary distribution provides a long-run forecast of the shape of the distribution of
regional income levels.
Kremer et al. (2001) make the useful observation that, when considering in-
come levels for aggregate economic units, banded into wide classes, it is likely
that the only non-zero transition probabilities are those between adjacent income
classes. More dramatic relative movements are unlikely for countries or regions,
at least over short spans of time. In this case, the ratios of the individual elements
of the stationary distribution can be derived as ratios of transition probabilities.
But since a ratio can be sensitive to a small change in its denominator, the estim-
ated stationary distribution may be sensitive to small changes in the estimated
transition probabilities. Hence, at least when the stationary distribution is the
main result of interest, one drawback of this approach is a lack of robustness.
Kremer et al. suggest an alternative method, which is to iterate the estimated
process over a limited number of future periods and study the outcome, rather
than emphasizing the stationary distribution.
A further problem arises from the discretization that is often used to con-
struct the transition matrix. An alternative is to treat the state space as con-
tinuous and model the joint distribution of outcomes at t and t + τ, as in the
cross-country work of Quah (1997) and Johnson (2005), for example. But given
the number of regions typically available to a researcher, there is not a great
deal of information from which to estimate something as complex as a joint
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distribution, again implying a lack of robustness.
Despite its problems, an attractive aspect of the distribution dynamics ap-
proach is that it can be used to investigate regional polarization. Quah’s work
on national growth is strongly associated with his ‘twin peaks’ result, the find-
ing that the stationary distribution is bimodal. In the regional growth literature,
his methods have been the most popular approach to the study of polarization.
Some other methods are available, using various ways of defining polarization
(see Anderson et al. 2012 and Zhang and Kanbur 2001).
10.5 Multimodality and mixture densities
The hypothesis of polarization is a special case of a more general idea, that of
convergence clubs. A common intuition is that, over time, regions might sort
into distinct groups or clubs, such as rich and poor. Their respective positions
could then reflect disparate steady-states, or even the possibility of multiple
equilibria. These ideas have been discussed repeatedly in the literature. Using
Quah’s methods can provide some insight, but approaches have emerged which
provide more direct information on the existence of clubs and their membership.
One approach is ‘bump hunting’, or the use of formal statistical tests for
multimodality, as in Pittau and Zelli (2006). But for many purposes, a more
informative approach is to model the cross-section distribution of a regional
variable as a mixture distribution. To give an example from regional economics,
if regions tend to belong either to an industrialized and services-oriented urban
core or to a rural, agricultural periphery, the data might be generated by a mix-
ture distribution with two components. The data for a given region are then
drawn from one component distribution with some probability, and the other
component with the complementary probability; the idea generalizes readily to
mixtures with more than two components. Methods for finite mixtures can be
adopted to estimate characteristics of the components, such as means and vari-
ances, and also provide a probabilistic classification that can be used to assign
(‘fuzzily’) any given region to one of the component distributions.
For investigating convergence clubs, alternatives to the mixture density ap-
proach address parameter heterogeneity in various ways. Canova (2004) is one
of the first contributions along these lines. Other methods for sample-splitting
include a regression tree approach as in Johnson and Takeyama (2001), or the
methods for inference for threshold estimation developed by Hansen (2000).
These approaches typically invoke simple parametric models estimated on sub-
samples, indicating the extent of parameter heterogeneity. This seems most use-
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ful when the hypotheses of interest can be captured by simple regression spe-
cifications, but as we have emphasized, general equilibrium models often rule
this out.
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